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DISRESPECTFUL DISSENT: JUSTICE SCALIA’S
REGRETTABLE LEGACY OF INCIVILITY
J. Lyn Entrikin*
Just as we judge people by . . . the principles they reject as
well as the values they affirmatively maintain, so do we
look at judges’ dissents, as well as their decisions for the
1
court, as we evaluate judicial careers.

During his nearly thirty years on the Supreme Court, the
late Justice Antonin Scalia earned a reputation for writing
vitriolic dissents.2 Meanwhile, the general tone of civic
discourse has become at best dismaying and at worst
demoralizing.3 Justice Scalia did not live long enough to witness
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1. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 428 (1986).
2. E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 323 (2014)
(noting that Justice Scalia stood alone for “consistently” writing “with sarcasm”); Brian
Christopher Jones, Disparaging the Supreme Court: Is SCOTUS in Serious Trouble? 2015
WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 53, 62 (referring to Justice Scalia’s “decadent language”); Richard
L. Hasen, The Most Sarcastic Justice, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 215, 215 (2015) (finding
“unparalleled” Justice Scalia’s “nastiness, particularly directed at other Justices’
opinions”).
3. E.g., Clarence Thomas, Civility and Public Discourse, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 515,
515–16 (1997) (“[C]ivility is disappearing from public discourse and public conduct. . . .
[U]nless each of us . . . encourage[s] others, by example, to become more civil, we will be
contributing to the erosion of the rules that allow our civil society to function.”); see also,
e.g., Michael R. Wolf et al., Incivility and Standing Firm: A Second Layer of Partisan
Division, 45 POL. SCI. & POLITICS 428, 428 (2012) (noting widespread concern that decline
in tone of political discourse is “worse than ever,” threatens the “long-term stability of
America’s governing institutions” and “damage[es] the ability to resolve complex public
problems”); Erica Werner & Mark Sherman, Gorsuch: Trump’s Attacks on Judges
“Disheartening,” “Demoralizing”, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-gorsuch-supreme-court-hearings-20170321-story
.html (“When anyone criticizes the honesty and integrity or the motives of a federal judge,
I find that disheartening, I find that demoralizing.”).
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the 2016 presidential campaign as it played out, nor could he
have anticipated how his death would reduce partisan polemics
to a new low.4 The political discourse characterizing the 2016
presidential election represented the modern nadir of civility in
the public square.
Largely insulated from such outside political pressures,
Supreme Court Justices long hewed to norms of civility,
collegiality, and respect, even if not always reaching consensus.
With few exceptions, the Justices have disagreed about even
controversial legal issues in mutually respectful discourse. They
have customarily demonstrated a deep appreciation for the
Court’s role in our democracy, and an understanding that public
respect and confidence in the Court’s institutional integrity is
essential for its independence.
Not so with Justice Scalia. His dissents frequently reflected
uncloaked scorn for the majority.5 And although he has been
celebrated in death as a brilliant judicial giant,6 his departure
from the custom of respectful dissent marked a turning point in
the Court’s tradition of collegiality and civility.7
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4. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Scalia’s Death Plunges Court, National Politics into
Turmoil, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/scaliasdeath-plunges-court-national-politics-into-turmoil/2016/02/13/136c0590-d2a4-11e5-b2bc988409ee911b_story.html?utm_term=.cc6ba93ac167 (predicting political controversy that
became a central feature of the 2016 presidential campaign); Jeffrey Toobin, In the
Balance, NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 2016, at 28 (“[T]he death of Antonin Scalia . . . jolted the
institution and affirmed . . . a venerable truism, attributed to the late Justice Byron White:
‘When you change one Justice, you change the whole Court.’”).
5. Despite the disdain Justice Scalia’s separate opinions often expressed for the views
of his fellow Justices, he and they disavowed any internal conflict as a result. See, e.g.,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010)
(sidestepping the question by referring to her friendship with Justice Scalia); Antonin
Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 33, 40–41 (Dec. 1994) (explaining
that separate opinions “do not, or at least need not, produce animosity and bitterness among
the members of the Court,” in which dissents are “normal”).
6. E.g., Yury Kapgan, Of Golf and Ghouls: The Prose Style of Justice Scalia Love Him
or Hate Him, Antonin Scalia Demands Attention, 9 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 71, 96 (2003)
(referring to a quote from a dissent as “Scaliaesque”); Christina Pazzanese, Death of a
Judicial Giant, HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 15, 2016), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/
2016/02/death-of-a-judicial-giant/ (referring to Justice Scalia as “a legal giant and defender
of conservative jurisprudence with a rapier wit and formidable intellect”).
7. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of
Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 623 (1994) (emphasizing that dissents are
essential for maintaining institutional integrity, but urging civility in expressing strong
judicial disagreement).
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Given the regrettable and apparently unchecked decline in
the civility of public discourse in all branches of our
government,8 we might consider whether Justice Scalia’s
increasingly vitriolic dissents set a new course for government
speech. And if they did, we should consider the implications for
his legacy. As one scholar observed, his “dissents have not won
over many adherents, and in some areas, despite the force of his
protest, he may well be on the wrong side of history.”9 Others
have warned that “the nastiness among the Justices contributes
to the lack of civility among lawyers.”10 Perhaps the “sting” of
Justice Scalia’s aggressive rhetoric was “somewhat mitigated by
its confinement, by and large, to dissents.”11 Or does a
disrespectful dissent by a Supreme Court Justice always set a
bad example?12
Part I of this article reviews the Supreme Court’s history of
issuing separate opinions. Part II maps the declining civility of
Justice Scalia’s dissents during his four years as a circuit judge
followed by three decades on the Court. Part III considers the
extent to which Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence has influenced the
law.13 Part IV assesses whether the increasingly divisive tone of
Supreme Court dissents implicates judicial ethics and
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8. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 3, at 515–16.
9. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE
COURT’S HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 407 (2015).
10. Gaffney, supra note 7, at 624; see also, e.g., Brian Porto, The Rhetorical Legacy of
Antonin Scalia, 43 VT. B.J. 28, 28 (Summer 2017) (characterizing Justice Scalia’s tone as
“prone to cross the rhetorical Rubicon between professional critique and personal attack”);
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Scorn, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1061, 1077 (1994)
(suggesting that Justice Scalia may have “crossed the line between lively language and
impermissibly caustic speech”); but cf. Thomas, supra note 3, at 516 (decrying decline of
civility elsewhere but praising the Court, “where civility is . . . not a matter for debate”).
11. Porto, supra note 10, at 29.
12. See Philip Allen Lacovara, Un-Courtly Manners: Quarrelsome Justices Are No
Longer a Model of Civility for Lawyers, 80 A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (Dec. 1994) (noting that the
Supreme Court “is not immune” and “appears disinclined to lead the legal profession back
toward more civilized discourse”); see also, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence
of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 401 (2000) (chiding
Justice Scalia for “the tone and rhetoric of his opinions”); Marie A. Failinger, Not Mere
Rhetoric: On Wasting or Claiming Your Legacy, Justice Scalia, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 425,
428 (2003) (addressing Justice Scalia in a public letter that apparently fell on deaf ears);
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 10, at 1077.
13. While dissenting opinions “can help to change the law,” Justice Scalia conceded
that dissents in the federal courts of appeals are more likely to do so than Supreme Court
dissents. Scalia, supra note 5, at 36–37, 41.
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undermines civility among the bench and bar. Finally, Part V
discusses whether Justice Scalia’s frequent departure from the
custom of respectful dissent contributed to the increasingly
negative tone of all contemporary government speech. The
article concludes by suggesting steps the Court should take to
ensure that Justices serve as exemplars of civility and respect in
public discourse.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S OPINION-ISSUING PRACTICES
Supreme Court Justices have not always had the same
14
attitude toward the expression of dissent.

A. The Early Years
For much of the Court’s early history, dissents were issued
only rarely,15 and then often only reluctantly and even
apologetically.16 Most of the earliest reported Supreme Court
opinions—issued from 1790 to 1800—were written “by the
Court,” without attribution by name to the opinion’s author.17
About one fourth were issued seriatim following the tradition of
English courts, each Justice issuing an individual opinion. Often
a seriatim opinion was followed by a brief order disposing of the
case.18 History does not make clear why some of the earliest
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 48 Side B
06/11/2018 08:46:58

14. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court
1790–1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 137 (1999).
15. UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 46–47; Kelsh, supra note 14, at 146–48; Scalia, supra
note 5, at 34.
16. See, e.g., Brown v. Md., 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419, 449–50 (1827) (Thompson, J.,
dissenting) (announcing dissent “with some reluctance, and very considerable diffidence”);
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 398 (1805) (Washington, J., dissenting)
(feeling compelled to dissent to “shew at least that the opinion was not hastily or
inconsiderately given”); see also Kelsh, supra note 14, at 159 & nn. 89, 133 (noting that
Marshall Court dissenters routinely expressed respect for fellow Justices).
17. See Kelsh, supra note 14, at 140; see, e.g., United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (Dall.)
121, 129 (1795) (“By the Court: We have consulted together on this motion; and, though a
difference of sentiment exists, a majority of the Court are clearly of opinion, that the
motion ought to be granted.”).
18. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 140; G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief
Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2006); see also,
e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (Dall.) 37 (1800); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (Dall.) 14 (1800);
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 133 (1795); Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (Dall.)
54 (1795); Ga. v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 402 (1792).
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opinions were issued “by the Court” and others seriatim, but in
the Court’s early years its opinions took no set form.
Beginning in 1801, opinions were almost exclusively
authored by Chief Justice John Marshall as a means of unifying
the Court and establishing its institutional authority.19 After
Justice William Johnson’s appointment in 1804, Chief Justice
Marshall was persuaded to rotate opinion writing, and Justice
Johnson occasionally issued separate opinions.20 Unanimity of
the Court’s decisions weakened further later in the Marshall era.
Chief Justice Marshall had his critics, including Thomas
Jefferson,21 but his tight rein over the Court’s early opinionissuing practices has been recognized as entrenching the
Supreme Court as a co-equal branch of government.22
B. The Beginnings of Respectful Dissent
During Chief Justice Taney’s leadership, dissents were so
uncommon that Justices often apologized for offering them.23
Typical are this introduction and conclusion:

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 49 Side A
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19. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 141–42; UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 46–47, 54; Cass
Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
786 (2015).
20. See UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 50, 54.
21. President Jefferson criticized Chief Justice Marshall’s approach to issuing opinions.
Id. at 47–54. In retirement, President Jefferson commended Justice William Johnson—
among his appointees to the Court—for his practice of writing separately:
I rejoice in the example you set of seriatim opinions. . . . Some of your brethren
will be encouraged to follow it occasionally, and in time, it may be felt by all as
a duty, and the sound practice of the primitive court be again restored. Why
should not every judge be asked his opinion, and give it from the bench, if only
by yea or nay? Besides ascertaining the fact of his opinion, which the public
have a right to know, in order to judge whether it is impeachable or not, it would
show whether the opinions were unanimous or not, and thus settle more exactly
the weight of their authority.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Pres. of the U.S. (ret.), to William Johnson, J., S. Ct. of the
U.S., 2 (June 12, 1823), TEACHING AM. HISTORY, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/
library/document/letter-to-justice-william-johnson/; see also, e.g., Oliver Schroeder, Jr.,
The Life and Judicial Work of Justice William Johnson, Jr., 95 U. PA. L. REV. 164, 168
(1946) (crediting Justice Johnson for altering the Court’s practice of issuing a single
opinion and asserting that “concurring and dissenting opinions restored an ancient
procedure which had been neglected”).
22. E.g., UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 54–55.
23. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 155. Indeed, from 1835 to 1941, fewer than ten percent of
all Supreme Court opinions were accompanied by dissents. M. Todd Henderson, From

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 49 Side B

06/11/2018 08:46:58

ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

206

6/4/2018 3:17 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

I dissent from the opinion of the court. The principle upon
which the case is decided is so important, and will operate
so widely, that I feel it my duty to show the grounds upon
which I differ. This will be done as briefly as I can; for my
object is to state the principles of law upon which my
opinion is formed, rather than to argue them at length.

.....
And believing, as I do, upon the best consideration I am
able to give to the subject, that the decision and the
principle upon which the opinion of the court founds itself
is inapplicable to the case before us, and that if it is carried
out to its legitimate results it will deprive the admiralty of
power, [which is] useful, and indeed necessary, for the
purposes of justice, and conferred on it by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, I must respectfully record
24
my dissent.

As the Court gradually took its place as a co-equal branch
of government, Justices began writing separately to demonstrate
the consistency of their individual views over time rather than to
express disagreements on specific issues.25 Dissents began to
underscore the Justices’ principles and views as separate
individuals rather than as faceless members of the Court’s
consensus.26 But even after separate opinions became less
apologetic, they almost always used respectful rhetoric.27 Yet

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 49 Side B
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Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 321
& tbl. 2 (2007).
24. Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. 583, 600–01, 617 (1857) (Taney, C.J., & Wayne, Grier &
Clifford, JJ., dissenting). As suggested by the Taylor dissent, members of the Taney Court
generally confined separate opinions to cases involving constitutional and other questions
of far-reaching public concern. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 150, 155–56; see UROFSKY, supra
note 9, at 57–58; e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 493 (1857) (Campbell, J.,
concurring) (“I concur in the judgment pronounced by the Chief Justice, but the importance
of the cause, the expectation and interest it has awakened, and the responsibility involved
in its determination, induce me to file a separate opinion.”), superseded by U.S. Const.
amends. XIII, XIV.
25. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 157 (noting that “by the mid-nineteenth century, “Justices
began to state that dissent was acceptable in order to protect or maintain their own records
or reputations” and “began to defend dissent less by reference to the issues involved and
more by reference to themselves”).
26. See id. at 157–59 & n.130.
27. Id. at 159 (“Marshall Court Justices had gone out of their way to express their
respect for the opinions of their brethren.”).
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there were exceptions. As early as 1854, a concurring Justice
pointedly criticized the Court’s reasoning:
[T]he decision . . . seems to me incomprehensible, unless
understood as designed to overrule [Vidal v. Girard’s
Executors], and every authority from the English chancery
cited and commented upon in its support. For such an
assault upon the previous decision of this court, wielding a
blow so trenchant and fatal at one great and acknowledged
head of equity jurisprudence, the head of trusts, my mind is
28
not prepared.

Illustrative of the Taney Court’s norms of internal
collegiality and mutual respect is Dred Scott,29 the most divisive
decision of the nineteenth century. The Justices’ nine separate
opinions and the political controversy they engendered
foreshadowed the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation,
and later the adoption and ratification of the post-Civil War
amendments to the Bill of Rights.30
Justices McLean and Curtis issued dissents, both respectful,
cordial, and couched in lofty discourse.31 Justice McLean
objected to anything in the majority opinion beyond its holding
that the court below lacked jurisdiction, but he also respectfully
addressed the central issue:
In this case, a majority of the court have said that a slave
may be taken by his master into a Territory of the United
States, the same as a horse, or any other kind of property.
. . . A slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 50 Side A
06/11/2018 08:46:58

28. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 398 (1854) (Daniel, J., concurring)
(citing Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 183 (1844)).
29. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Justice Ginsburg recently referred to Dred Scott as
“the most dreadful decision the Court ever wrote.” A Conversation with Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Professor Aaron Saiger, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1497, 1502 (2017)
[hereinafter Ginsburg Conversation].
30. While Chief Justice Taney authored the majority opinion, for all practical purposes
the case was decided seriatim because each Justice issued a separate opinion. Dred Scott,
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 399–454 (Taney, C.J.); id. at 454–56 (Wayne, J., concurring); 457–69
(Nelson, J., concurring); id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring); id. at 469–93 (Daniel, J.,
concurring); id. at 493–518 (Campbell, J., concurring); id. at 518–29 (Catron, J.,
concurring); id. at 529–64 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 564–633 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39
ABA J. 794, 797 (Sept. 1953) (quoting a portion of Justice Curtis’s dissent as “a model of
temperate, reasoned discussion of a hotly debated legal-political controversy in a time of
exceptional political excitement”).
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his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man;
32
and he is destined to an endless existence.

Justice Curtis wrote more forcefully, but still respectfully:
If this power [to declare who is a citizen] exists, what
persons born within the States may be President or Vice
President of the United States, or members of either House
of Congress, or hold any office or enjoy any privilege
whereof citizenship of the United States is a necessary
33
qualification, must depend solely on the will of Congress.

.....
Whatever individual claims may be founded on local
circumstances, or sectional differences of condition, cannot
. . . be recognized in this court, without arrogating to the
judicial branch . . . powers not committed to it; and which
34
. . . I do not think it fitted to wield.

And Justice Curtis concluded in an almost apologetic tone,
explaining his reasons for writing separately:
I have expressed my opinion, and the reasons therefor, at
far greater length than I could have wished, upon the
different questions on which I have found it necessary to
pass . . . . These questions are numerous, and the grave
importance of some of them required me to exhibit fully the
grounds of my opinion. . . . To have done either more or
less, would have been inconsistent with my views of my
35
duty.

06/11/2018 08:46:58

32. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 549–50 (McLean, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 577–78 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 626 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 633 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Even the concurring opinion by Justice Wayne
was respectful, and almost apologetic, in commenting on the badly divided decision:
It would certainly be a subject of regret, that the conclusions of the court have
not been assented to by all of its members, if I did not know from its history and
my own experience how rarely it has happened that the judges have been
unanimous upon constitutional questions of moment, and if our decision in this
case had not been made by as large a majority of them as has been usually had
on constitutional questions of importance.
Id. at 455 (Wayne, J., concurring).
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During Chief Justice Taney’s later years and as the Civil
War approached, the tone of separate opinions shifted from the
norm of respect to reflect increasing hostility. Justices became
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less concerned about the Court’s role as an institution and
instead focused their attention on their individual reputations.36
C. The Separate Opinion in a Time of Socioeconomic Turmoil
After Chief Justice Taney’s death in 1864, Supreme Court
Justices filed separate opinions in an expanding range of cases,
even while continuing to express reluctance in doing so.37 But
some Justices also occasionally issued unapologetic separate
opinions expressing disdain for the Court’s opinions.38
By the late nineteenth century, separate opinions were no
longer considered out of the ordinary. In 1892, a brief dissent
issued by Justice Brewer39 expressly relied on the “elaborate
discussions” by dissenting Justices in an earlier case, a highly
unusual practice at the time.40 Also during this period, dissents
occasionally became law, either by constitutional amendment41
or by the Court’s overruling earlier decisions in favor of
dissenting viewpoints.42 No doubt the political impact of the
Court’s reversals on the controversial issues of the day offered

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 51 Side A
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36. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 157–59 & n.130.
37. Id. at 160, 161–66.
38. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), for example, Justice Field wrote that “[t]he
principle upon which the opinion of the majority proceeds is, in my judgment, subversive
of the rights of private property, heretofore believed to be protected by constitutional
guaranties against legislative interference, and is in conflict with the authorities cited in its
support.” Id. at 136 (Field, J., dissenting).
39. Budd v. N.Y., 143 U.S. 517, 548–49 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
40. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 172 (discussing Munn).
41. E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV (overruling Dred Scott).
42. E.g., The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (overruling Hepburn
v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870)). The dissent in Hepburn, joined by three
Justices, was particularly strident in tone, and was perhaps among the earliest critiques of
what is now known as judicial activism:
[The majority’s] whole argument of the injustice of the law, an injustice which if
it ever existed will be repeated by now holding it wholly void; and of its
opposition to the spirit of the Constitution, is too abstract and intangible for
application to courts of justice, and is, above all, dangerous as a ground on
which to declare the legislation of Congress void by the decision of a court. It
would authorize this court to enforce theoretical views of the genius of the
government, or vague notions of the spirit of the Constitution and of abstract
justice, by declaring void laws which did not square with those views. It
substitutes our ideas of policy for judicial construction, an undefined code of
ethics for the Constitution, and a court of justice for the National legislature.
Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 638 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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an irresistible incentive for minority Justices to express
dissenting viewpoints.43
D. The Anti-Dissent Movement
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the bar began to
express strong opposition to the practice of issuing dissents.44
The opposition was motivated primarily by two concerns. First,
separate opinions weakened the judiciary’s institutional
authority45 by undermining the certainty and predictability of the
law. Second, they were antithetical to the collective nature of
courts and the appropriate role of judges.46 Yet separate opinions
could also reflect the democratic notion that courts, like
legislatures, are deliberative bodies. The practice of announcing
dissenting viewpoints was said to reflect the transparency and
public access valued in the American judicial system.47

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 51 Side B
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43. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873) (Field, J.,
dissenting). Professor Urofsky calls Justice Field’s dissent in The Slaughter-House Cases
the “first modern dissent” because “it not only contradicted the ruling and reasoning of the
majority, but also set out the arguments that would ultimately be accepted as correct.”
Melvin I. Urofsky, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Art of Judicial Dissent, 39 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 919, 922–23 (2012).
Yet some Justices of this era circulated proposed dissents primarily to influence the
content and reasoning of opinions for the Court. Justice Brandeis, for example, wrote
dissents that he later withheld from publication. Id. at 929; see generally ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE SUPREME COURT
AT WORK 200 (1957).
44. Hunter Smith, Personal and Official Authority: Turn-of-the-Century Lawyers and
the Dissenting Opinion, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 507, 508–09 (2012) (summarizing the
thirty-year debate about publishing dissents in courts of last resort); see also C.A.
Hereschoff Bartlett, Dissenting Opinions, 32 L. MAG. & REV. 54, 55 (Nov. 1906) (“What
possible good can result from a dissenting opinion? . . . It simply litters up pages of law
reports with divergent views, the dissenting judge frequently posing as the champion of a
lost cause.”)
45. See Smith, supra note 44, at 518–19.
46. See id. at 540; see also Henry Wollman, Evils of Dissenting Opinions, 57 ALB. L.J.
74, 74 (1898) (“There never should be a dissenting opinion in a case decided by a court of
last resort. No judge, lawyer or layman should be permitted to weaken the force of the
court’s decision, which all must accept as an unappealable finality.”).
47. See Emlin McClain, Dissenting Opinions, 14 YALE L.J. 191, 192, 195–96 (1905).
Some commentators celebrated Supreme Court dissents:
There is a class of dissenting opinions however which is well worthy of the
closest attention on the part of the American bar. They are marked . . . by certain
peculiarities which give them permanent value. I refer to the dissenting opinions
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Perhaps as a result of the legal uncertainty associated with
separate opinions, they became increasingly unpopular with the
bar.48 Legal periodicals and general-interest newspapers alike
took positions for and against, and the question was frequently
debated at bar meetings.49 One trigger may have been Plessy v.
Ferguson,50 which reaffirmed the “separate but equal” doctrine
by upholding a Louisiana statute requiring segregated railway
cars.51 In dissent, Justice Harlan pointedly challenged the
Court’s reasoning:
The arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis of race
while they are on a public highway is a badge of servitude
wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality
before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be
52
justified upon any legal grounds.

Soon after Plessy, Louisiana amended its constitution to prohibit
minority opinions.53 But by 1921, the opposition movement lost
force as judicial dissent came to be viewed as a sign of the
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delivered by members of the Supreme Court of the United States upon questions
of constitutional law.
Hampton L. Carson, Great Dissenting Opinions, 50 ALB. L.J. 120, 120 (1894) (conceding
nevertheless that “[t]he active practitioner is chiefly concerned with the law as it is
declared by the majority of a court, and pays little heed to a shrill or feeble shriek as to
what it might or ought to be”).
48. E.g., William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 GREEN BAG 690, 693 (1905)
(calling dissents “judicial mistakes” that injured “public respect for courts”); McClain,
supra note 47, at 198 (noting that dissents are “in many cases . . . unwise and injudicious”).
49. Smith, supra note 44, at 511–12.
50. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled in part, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–
95 (1954).
51. Id. at 543, 549–51.
52. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). And Justice Harlan had more to say:
If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public highways
established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than those that will
surely come from state legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon
the basis of race. We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other
peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which,
practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our
fellow citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disguise of “equal”
accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor
atone for the wrong this day done.
Id.
53. Smith, supra note 44, at 513 & n.36 (citing LA. CONST. art. 92 (adopted 1898;
rescinded 1921)).
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common law’s adaptability54 rather than “a pernicious, private
indulgence.”55
E. The Rise of Consensus and Acquiescence
Chief Justice Taft chaired the commission that drafted the
ABA’s first code of judicial conduct, issued in 1924.56 No fan of
dissents,57 he urged restraint by dissenting Justices, promoting
the addition of Canon 19 titled “Judicial Opinions.”58 The canon
acknowledged that a written opinion “promotes confidence in
[the judge’s] intellectual integrity and may contribute useful
precedent to the growth of the law.”59 But it discouraged courts
of last resort from issuing separate opinions, urging judges to
exercise “effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of
conclusion and the consequent influence of judicial decision.”60
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54. McClain, supra note 47, at 193–94 (describing written opinions’ essential function
as guiding others on force and effect of court rulings on facts presented); Smith, supra note
44, at 538.
55. Smith, supra note 44, at 538. As early as 1905, some considered dissents “not only
proper, but necessary” in some cases and that suppressing dissent would likely “obstruct
. . . the harmonious and safe development of the law.” McClain, supra note 47, at 199. But
the potential for abuse was obvious even then: “The writer of the dissent has a decided
advantage in that his work is in the main critical and destructive rather than constructive.”
Id.
56. Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model
Code: The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUSTICE SYS. J. 271, 273 (2007) (reviewing the history
of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics).
57. Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Disunity, the Judges’ Bill
and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 W. POL. QUARTERLY 471, 481 (1977)
(observing that the Court’s marked increase in dissenting opinions began while Taft was
Chief Justice, “despite his strong antipathy to dissent” and his tradition of discouraging
dissents “for the sake of institutional unity”).
58. John Alder, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices? 20 OXFORD J. OF
LEG. STUDIES 221, 244 (2000); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional
Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1267, 1284 & n.55, 1344–45, 1346, 1348, 1356 (2001) (describing Court’s
involvement in drafting Canon 19 as reflecting norm of consensus in the 1920s and noting
that Canon 19 survived until 1972, when the Code was substantially revised). The ABA’s
Code-revision committee considered Canon 19’s “detailed discussion of judicial
opinions . . . as neither being helpful nor, for the most part, matters of ethical conduct.” E.
WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 50 (1973).
59. ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, at Canon 19 (1924), available at https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/pic_migrated/
1924_canons.authcheckdam.pdf (1924) [hereinafter 1924 Canons]
60. Id.
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Perhaps anticipating the Scaliaesque dissent, Canon 19 noted
that
[a] judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value more
highly his individual reputation than that of a court to
which he should be loyal. Except in case of conscientious
difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting
61
opinions should be discouraged in courts of last resort.

Ironically, the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics never applied to
federal judges, and Canon 19 has been cited only rarely.62
Another major event probably mitigated the influence of
Canon 19. The Judiciary Act of 1925 significantly altered the
nature of the Supreme Court’s docket and generated more time
for Justices to write separate opinions.63 The Court itself had
urged Congress to enact the bill “to cope with the growth in its
business and to conserve its energies for issues appropriate to
the Supreme Bench.”64
With few exceptions, the Act essentially eliminated cases
over which the Court’s review was mandatory and granted it
authority to control its own docket through writs of certiorari.65
By this time, dissents were entrenched in the Court’s practice,66
and the statutory changes allowed the Justices sufficient time to
prepare, circulate, and deliberate over their dissents, which
“entail[ed] as much labor as majority opinions.”67 No longer
bound to resolve routine appeals, the Court accepted cases much
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 53 Side A
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61. Id.
62. One of the few cases to cite Canon 19 was State ex rel. Shea v. Judicial Standards
Comm’n, 643 P.2d 210, 223 (Mont. 1982). The Montana court declined to sanction a judge
for using “intemperate” language in a dissent, concluding that “[a]s long as a justice, or a
judge . . . does not resort to profane, vulgar or insulting language that offends good morals,
it may hardly be considered ‘misconduct in office.’” Id.
63. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 794–95 (describing cases).
64. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act
of 1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1928); see also id. at 4 (“Indeed, the Act was an effort by
the Court to cut the coat of jurisdiction according to the cloth of the time and energy of the
nine Justices.”).
65. Id. at 1–3; Halpern & Vines, supra note 57, at 472. The Judiciary Act of 1925 is
generally considered a watershed in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence, not only
because it gave the Court considerable discretion over the nature of the cases it decided,
but also because it substantially reduced the Court’s caseload. See Halpern & Vines, supra
note 57, at 482–83.
66. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 64, at 15 (“Its practice may well be characterized
as one of the settled traditions of the Court.”).
67. Id. at 15–18 (including tables that show distribution of opinions).
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more likely to present challenging issues,68 especially during
and after the New Deal era. The controversial socioeconomic
issues raised in these cases understandably prompted more
disagreement among Justices.
In 1928, Charles Evans Hughes—then a former Justice of
the Supreme Court who would soon be appointed Chief
Justice—delivered a series of lectures at Columbia University.
They included his famous statement about the dissent’s appeal
“to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into
which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been
betrayed.”69 But that lofty, often-quoted passage is almost
always taken out of context. While Justice Hughes generally
valued minority opinions, at least in “important controversies,”70
he conceded that dissents “detract from the force of the
[majority’s] judgment.”71 Read in proper context, his
perspective on dissents was more equivocal than has generally
been reported.
His published lectures certainly reflect that Justice Hughes
valued judicial civility, even in separate opinions. After noting
that a court’s reputation rests on the “character and
independence of its judges,” he pointed out that

06/11/2018 08:46:58

68. Id.
69. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS
FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS—AN INTERPRETATION 68 (1928).
70. Id. at 70; see also id. at 64–70 (discussing opinions in general).
71. Id. at 67. “Undoubtedly, they do. When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice
of conviction, it strongly commends the decision to public confidence.” Id.
72. Id. at 67–68.
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[t]his does not mean that a judge should be swift to dissent,
or that he should dissent for the sake of self-exploitation or
because of a lack of that capacity for cooperation which is
of the essence of any group action, whether judicial or
otherwise. Independence does not mean cantankerousness
and a judge may be a strong judge without being an
impossible person. Nothing is more distressing on any
bench than the exhibition of a captious, impatient,
72
querulous spirit.
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F. (Mostly) Respectful Dissent on the Roosevelt Court
After 1941, when Harlan Fiske Stone was appointed Chief
Justice, the Court’s consensus norm ended at a remarkable
pace.73 Chief Justice Stone did not believe he was empowered to
discourage Justices from publicly disagreeing with the majority.
In fact, he believed dissents were the natural result of thoughtful
debate and deliberation on controversial issues.74
Chief Justice Stone’s internal administrative innovations
transformed the inner workings of the Court into nine “separate
law offices, with individual Justices elaborating their own
views.”75 But his leadership was not the only reason for the
decline in consensus. Much of the change is probably
attributable to the Court’s significant turnover during the
Roosevelt years. Between 1937 and 1941 alone, President
Roosevelt nominated eight new Justices.76
Before 1947, official case reports identified by name only
the Justice who authored the Court’s opinion or any separate
opinion, unless another Justice specifically asked to be identified
with a particular opinion. But once the front matter of every
opinion identified each Justice’s position, silent acquiescence
became less frequent and draft opinions began circulating
among the Justices. Thus, Justices became personally (and
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73. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 789.
74. See Kelsh, supra note 14, at 177–79; Sunstein, supra note 19, at 789–90. Stone
himself dissented more frequently than any previous Chief Justice. Sunstein, supra note 19,
at 790.
75. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 789–90.
76. Id. at 775 & n.30. He nominated another in 1943 to replace one of those eight, who
resigned after two years to serve in the Roosevelt administration.
President Roosevelt’s appointment of academics, including Felix Frankfurter and
William O. Douglas, may also have shifted the Court’s internal dynamic toward the robust
disagreements that sometimes characterize law faculty meetings. See id. at 793. Justices
Frankfurter and Douglas both had “strong personalities” and “had not been fully socialized
into a judicial culture that prized a norm of consensus.” Id. Justice Frankfurter’s judicial
brethren also disliked his “pedantic” dissents and “condescending” attitude. One Court
scholar concluded,
As his dream of leading the Court slipped away, Frankfurter grew nastier and his
temper shorter. The papers of the [J]ustices who served with him are littered
with notes from Frankfurter accusing them of everything from stupidity to the
inability to understand the law; what he said behind their backs, and in his diary,
usually went much further.
UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 232.
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perhaps even politically) accountable for their respective
positions, which may have prompted more frequent separate
opinions.77 In addition, the jurisprudential shift away from
formalism to realism during this period likely influenced the
pattern and frequency of minority opinions.78
G. The Norm of Consensus and Respect in the Civil Rights Era
By the mid-twentieth century, some dissents had become
more strident, and scholars called for more civility and
restraint.79 In 1954, soon after Earl Warren became Chief
Justice, the Court unanimously decided Brown v. Board of
Education.80 And after 1957, dissenters adopted the customary
tone of the “respectful dissent.”81 Under Chief Justice Warren,
the Court demonstrated a surprising degree of consensus—and
even occasional unanimity—in many of that era’s controversial
civil rights cases, including not only Brown but also Bates v.
City of Little Rock,82 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States,83 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,84 and Loving v.
Virginia.85
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77. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 797; see also id. at 802.
78. Id. at 798.
79. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 31, at 795–97 (pointedly critiquing dissents of
California Supreme Court Justice Jesse W. Carter).
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Scholars have credited the Court’s unanimity in Brown to
Chief Justice Warren’s leadership. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, The Rule of Law and the
Achievement of Unanimity in Brown, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 749–50 (2004)
(recognizing unanimity as Chief Justice Warren’s “signal achievement”); Dennis J.
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–
1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 34 (1979).
81. Chris Kulawik, Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the
“Respectful” Dissent, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1317–18 (2011) (crediting Justice
Whittaker with using the phrase that has since become the customary language of collegial
disagreement); see also id. at 1318 & n.87. Yet Chief Justice Taney was apparently the first
Justice to adopt the phrase. See Thomas v. Osborn, 60 U.S. 22, 56 (1856) (Taney, C.J.,
dissenting). And other dissenting Justices recited it before the phrase first appeared in a
dissent authored by Justice Whittaker. Compare Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 71
(1957) (Clark, J., dissenting), with City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of Am., 355 U.S. 489,
511 (1958) (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
82. 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (addressing freedom of association).
83. 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (applying Civil Rights Act to private businesses).
84. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (reaffirming freedom of the press).
85. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down statutes banning interracial marriage).
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The tradition of respect continued for almost thirty years,
even in Roe v. Wade,86 certainly among the most divisive cases
of the modern era.87 Then-Justice Rehnquist, for example,
adopted a polite and deferential tone in his Roe dissent:
The Court’s opinion brings to the decision of this troubling
question both extensive historical fact and a wealth of legal
scholarship. While the opinion thus commands my respect,
I find myself nonetheless in fundamental disagreement with
those parts of it that invalidate the Texas statute in
88
question, and therefore dissent.

But once Justice Scalia arrived in 1986, the tone of
Supreme Court discourse would never be the same.89

06/11/2018 08:46:58

In a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable
men may easily and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court’s exercise of its
clear power of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to
protect human life and by investing women and doctors with the constitutionally
protected right to exterminate it. This issue, for the most part, should be left with
the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their
affairs.
Id. at 221–22 (White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Others have reached similar
conclusions about the respectful separate opinions in Roe. See, e.g., Ronald J. Placone, The
United States Supreme Court and Abortion: A Decline in Civility, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
181, 190–91 (2011).
89. Alan B. Morrison, Remembering Justice Antonin Scalia, 101 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 12, 12 (2016) (surmising that Justice Scalia was confirmed in part because he
had “no record that would suggest how he would vote in controversial cases before the
Supreme Court”). “[T]o many who thought they knew Judge Scalia reasonably well when
he was appointed, he turned out to be a much different Justice than they had expected.” Id.
at 14. But some of the opinions he wrote as a circuit judge suggested that he could be
irascible, impatient, and aggressive. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 137–59, infra.
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86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. E.g., Bret D. Asbury, Law as Palimpsest: Conceptualizing Contingency in Judicial
Opinions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 121, 144 (2009) (“Roe is one of the most widely read and
controversial opinions of the twentieth century”).
88. Roe, 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist ended his dissent
with the then-customary phrase: “For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.”
Id. at 178. Justice White issued a more strongly worded dissent in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973), decided with Roe, but he too adopted a nominally respectful tone:
With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the language or history of the
Constitution to support the Court’s judgments. . . . As an exercise of raw judicial
power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but in my view
its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial
review that the Constitution extends to this Court.
.....
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II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S RHETORICAL LEGACY
We write what we are, and perhaps, more than others,
judges are what they write.90

Were Justice Scalia’s separate opinions motivated by a
genuine desire to appeal to the “brooding spirit of the law, the
intelligence of a future day”? Or was he too “swift to dissent,”
choosing to “dissent for the sake of self-exploitation” for lack of
“capacity for cooperation”? Was he, in the end, just a
“cantankerous” and “impossible person” with a “captious,
impatient, querulous spirit”?91
By the end of his life, Justice Scalia’s propensity to dissent
was notably greater than might have been expected from his
early years on the federal bench. He acknowledged in a 1994
article that “[t]he foremost and undeniable external consequence
of a separate dissenting or concurring opinion is to destroy the
appearance of unity and solidarity.”92 And he agreed that the
unanimity of the Court’s “epochal decision” in Brown facilitated
its acceptance during the highly charged political controversy
surrounding school desegregation. He conceded that separate
opinions can “obfuscate rather than clarify” the law.93 And he
recognized that they may lead to “a sort of vote-counting
approach” in predicting Court decisions on significant issues of
law.94
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90. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1415 (1995).
91. HUGHES, supra note 69, at 68.
92. Scalia, supra note 5, at 35; see also Antonin Scalia, Dissents, OAH MAG. HISTORY
18 (1998) (restating this conviction in a slightly edited version of 1994 article). Indeed, “if
the Court is persistently fragmented, and if the fragmentation occurs along political
grounds, some people will lose faith in it—especially if their preferred views are
consistently rejected.” Sunstein, supra note 19, at 816; but cf. Micah Schwartzman,
Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1019 (2008) (defending judicial “candor” and
“sincerity” but lamenting judicial critiques of one another “in disrespectful terms”).
93. Scalia, supra note 5, at 38.
94. Id. at 39. Justice Scalia’s writing also presaged the political reaction to news of his
death: “Whenever one of the five Justices in a 5–4 constitutional decision has been
replaced there is a chance, astute counsel must think, of getting that decision overruled.”
Id.; see supra note 4 and accompanying text; cf. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 806–07
(arguing that the credibility and legitimacy of a deeply divided decision likely have more to
do with public predilections than vote-counting).
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On the other hand, Justice Scalia also apparently believed
that an opinion for the Court, signed by its author and
accompanied by signed dissents, demonstrates that the Court’s
work is the product of “independent and thoughtful minds,”
rather than the product of judges who value consensus merely to
achieve “some supposed ‘good of the institution.’”95 In
concluding that the merits of separate opinions outweigh their
disadvantages, Justice Scalia’s thoughts mirrored the perspective
espoused decades earlier by Chief Justice Hughes. He even
acknowledged that concurring opinions issued “only to say the
same thing better than the court has done, or worse still, to
display the intensity of the concurring judge’s feelings on the
issue” amount to an abuse that might even counsel against
issuing separate opinions.96
Yet after serving on the federal bench for less than a
decade, Justice Scalia had already earned a reputation for his
biting, acerbic dissents.97 By the end of his judicial career, his
separate opinions had been variously described as “harshly
worded,”98 “sarcastic and divisive with a cutting writing style,”99
“acid,”100
“corrosive,”101
belligerent,102
“hostil[e],”103
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95. Scalia, supra note 5, at 35.
96. Id. at 33. Yet Justice Scalia’s concurring opinions often appeared to do just that.
97. See infra notes 157–225 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia himself once
conceded that his tone could be “sharp.” But “sharpness is sometimes needed to
demonstrate how much of a departure I believe a thing is. Especially in my dissents.”
Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), nymag.com/
news/features/Antonin-scalia-2013f-10/. In one of his last dissents, Justice Scalia attempted
to rationalize the use of “extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and
expression” in concurring or dissenting opinions, while chastising the majority for doing so
in “the official opinion of the Court.” Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2630 (2015) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
98. Paul D. Clement, Why We Read the Scalia Opinion First, 101 JUDICATURE 53, 54
(2017).
99. Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 399 (“No justice in Supreme Court history has
consistently written with the sarcasm of Justice Scalia. No doubt, this makes his opinions
among the most entertaining to read.”); Hasen, supra note 2, at 215, 224–27 (listing
seventy-five sarcastic Scalia opinions); Kapgan, supra note 6, at 85 (“Sarcasm is indeed
par for Scalia’s course.” (citing PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700 (2001) (Scalia
& Thomas, JJ., dissenting)); Adam Liptak, Scalia Lands at Top of Sarcasm Index of
Justices. Shocking, N.Y. TIMES, at A10 (Jan. 19, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/01/20/us/scalia-lands-at-top-of-sarcasm-index-of-justices-shocking.html?_r=0.
100. Liptak, supra note 99.
101. Michael O’Donnell, What’s the Point of a Supreme Court Dissent? NATION, https:
//www.thenation.com/article/whats-the-point-of-a-supreme-court-dissent/ (Jan. 21, 2016)
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“caustic,”104 “invective,”105 “degrading,”106 “brutal,”107 “outside
the boundaries of judicial discourse,”108 “strident and
contentious,”109 “bold vitriol,”110 a “torrent of outrage,”111
“prone to stylish stabs,”112 “vituperative,”113 and even
“nasty.”114 They were perhaps written as much to garner
attention115 and entertain116 as to enlighten readers.117 Justice
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(“[C]orrosive rhetoric like Scalia’s does more than fray relationships on the Court; it
convinces the public that the justices are political stooges.”).
102. David A. Yalof et al., Collegiality Among U.S. Supreme Court Justices? 95
JUDICATURE 12, 13 (July–Aug. 2011) (“During his nearly two decades on the Rehnquist
Court, Scalia cemented his reputation as a stubborn and recalcitrant character, relentlessly
attacking those who might disagree with his ideology or judging philosophy.” (footnote
omitted)).
103. Edward L. Rubin, Question Regarding D.C. v. Heller: As a Justice, Antonin Scalia
Is (a) Great, (b) Acceptable, (c) Injudicious, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2008) (noting
several instances of “hostility” in Heller dissent)). Professor Rubin acknowledged Justice
Scalia’s “energetically articulated opinions,” id. at 1110, while noting the different
rhetorical styles used in his dissents and his opinions for the Court. Rubin’s answer to the
question posed in his title was “injudicious.” Id.at 1130.
104. Wald, supra note 90, at 1416.
105. Thomas Przybylowski, Note, A Man of Genius Makes No Mistakes: Judicial
Civility and the Ethics of the Opinion, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1257, 1261 (2016).
106. David Kravitz, Why We Should Ignore Justice Scalia’s Nasty Zingers, WASH.
POST (July 31, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justice-scalias-appallingzingers/2015/07/31/0f5db50c-36f5-11e5-b673-1df005a0fb28_story.html?utm_term=.f5ae0
ff93ec0.
107. Michael J. Gerhardt, Justice Scalia's Legacies, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 221, 229
(2017).
108. Rubin, supra note 103, at 1129 n.144.
109. Id. at 1130.
110. Jones, supra note 2, at 62 (referring specifically to Justice Scalia’s June 2015
dissents in King and Obergefell).
111. David Auerbach, R-E-S-P-E-C-T, Find Out What It Means to Scalia, LEX.I.CON
VALLEY: A BLOG ABOUT LANGUAGE (June 26, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon
_valley/2015/06/26/the_surprising_history_of_the_respectful_dissent_at_the_supreme_cou
rt.html; see also Kapgan, supra note 6, at 86 (“‘[A]t times [Justice Scalia’s rejection of
abortion rights] has swelled over banks and turned into a torrent of abuse submerging the
ordinarily depersonalized language of opinions.’” (quoting RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR.,
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 277 (1997)).
112. Wald, supra note 90, at 1383.
113. Porto, supra note 10, at 30.
114. Kravitz, supra note 106; O’Donnell, supra note 101; see also Hasen, supra note 2,
at 215 (“[Justice Scalia’s] ability (and willingness) to engage in nastiness, particularly
directed at other Justices’ opinions, is unparalleled.”); Yalof et al., supra note 102, at 13
(quoting Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Justices Need to Regain Civility, USA TODAY, May
14, 1991, at 7A)).
115. Hasen, supra note 2, at 216 (opining that Justice Scalia’s sarcasm “gain[s]
attention for his ideas”); Kapgan, supra note 6, at 74 (describing Justice Scalia’s prose as

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 57 Side A

06/11/2018 08:46:58

ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

DISRESPECTFUL DISSENT

6/4/2018 3:17 PM

221

Scalia once surmised that law students might no longer need to
read academic writings about legal controversies because
“[t]hose controversies appear in the opposing opinions of the
Supreme Court itself, and can be studied from that text.”118 His
self-professed motive for writing dissents was his desire to keep
the Court “at the forefront of the intellectual development of the
law,” even if it meant ceding influence to the legal academy,
albeit sometimes only dismissively.119
Justice Scalia’s early writings shed no light on the reasons
for the decline in civility his separate opinions exhibited over the
years. Occasionally, his dissents reflected what might be
considered merely acerbic wit, as when he referred to the
Court’s statutory interpretation as “sheer applesauce.”120 By
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“compelling—demanding of attention”); see also O’Donnell, supra note 101 (”Justices
have become so accustomed to having their say that they rarely put the Court’s prestige
above their own reputations.”).
116. Kravitz, supra note 106 (“Scalia’s zingers add nothing of substance to his
opinions; they are there to entertain, not to explain or enlighten.”); see also Clement, supra
note 98, at 53 (noting that while Justice Scalia’s writing was entertaining, “it had serious
consequences for the Court and its jurisprudence”). At times Justice Scalia injected humor
into his opinions, which occasionally defused some of his intemperance. Of his textualist
jurisprudence, for example, he once wrote that “the acid test of whether a word can
reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could use the word in that sense at a
cocktail party without having people look at you funny.” Johnson v. United States, 529
U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Perhaps he wrote separately for his own amusement. Justice Scalia found
professional satisfaction in issuing separate opinions: “To be able to write an opinion solely
for oneself, without the need to accommodate the views of one’s colleagues; . . . to express
precisely the degree of quibble, or foreboding, or disbelief, or indignation that one believes
the majority’s disposition should engender—that is indeed an unparalleled pleasure.”
Scalia, supra note 5, at 42; see also WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4
(1960) (“[T]he right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable for a judge of an
appellate court.”). Justice Scalia confessed that the pleasure of writing separate opinions
was “the most important of all.” Scalia, supra note 5, at 42.
118. Scalia, supra note 5, at 39; see also Clement, supra note 98, at 55 (“Scalia, ever
the law professor, had a great feel for that audience. . . . [S]tudents confess that they always
read the Scalia opinion first—even students who almost always disagreed with the Justice.
And who could blame them? Not only would the Scalia opinion lay the question bare and
articulate one side of the legal debate clearly and cogently, it would be a fun read.”)
119. Justice Scalia, himself a former law professor, exhibited disdain for academics on
more than one occasion. In one dissent he derisively declared that it was “indeed a
wonderful new world that the Court creates, one full of promise for administrative-law
professors in need of tenure articles . . . .” Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’n Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1019 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Zivotofsky ex
rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2121 (2015).
120. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 113 (2007) (Scalia,
Thomas & Souter, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The sheer applesauce of this statutory
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2015, however, his increasingly frequent dissents121 had long
reflected a harsh, vitriolic tone. The well-reasoned, temperate,
and concise separate opinions he sometimes wrote in his early
years as a judge became the exception. Some of his last dissents
reflected disrespectful judicial rhetoric at its worst. But although
his unusually biting rhetoric drew repeated criticism from Court
observers122 with some urging him to change his ways,123 Justice
Scalia neither listened nor seemed to care.124
This Part traces the evolution of Justice Scalia’s rhetorical
style as expressed in his separate opinions beginning in 1982
when he joined the D.C. Circuit. While a complete chronology
of Justice Scalia’s dissents is beyond the scope of this article, the
next three subsections illustrate the change in rhetorical style of
his dissents over the years.
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interpretation should be obvious.”); see also King v. Burwell, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct.
2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (referring to Court’s reasoning
as “pure applesauce”). Justice Scalia did not confine his witticisms to his dissents. Writing
for the Court, he once observed that “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say,
hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468
(2001).
121. In the last of his twenty-nine full terms, Justice Scalia issued thirteen dissents.
122. E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 783
(2017) (book review); Noel J. Francisco, A Law Clerk’s Reflections on Justice Scalia
(Aug. 4, 2016), available at https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/law-clerks-reflectionsjustice-scalia; Gerhardt, supra note 107; Robert G. Gibson, In Memory of Justice Antonin
Scalia, 28 DCBA BRIEF 16 (May 2016); Stephen A. Newman, Political Advocacy on the
Supreme Court: The Damaging Rhetoric of Antonin Scalia, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 907
(2006); Porto, supra note 10; Jeffrey M. Shaman, Justice Scalia and the Art of Rhetoric, 28
CONST. COMMENT. 287 (2012).
123. E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 399–400 (citing examples and concluding
that “this [rhetoric] sends exactly the wrong message to law students and attorneys about
what type of discourse is appropriate in a formal legal setting and how it is acceptable to
speak to one another.”); Failinger, supra note 12 (chronicling some of Justice Scalia’s
“memorable” comments); Newman, supra note 122, at 908.
124. See Senior, supra note 97, and accompanying text. One might wonder whether
Justice Scalia just pretended not to care. He apparently cared early in his Supreme Court
career. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 864
(1989) (anticipating that some of his dissents would eventually prevail).
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A. Dissenting Discourse as Circuit Judge: 1982–1986
Judge Scalia spent four years on the D.C. Circuit,125 issuing
relatively few separate opinions. He occasionally issued a biting
dissent, but his typical practice as a circuit judge did not reflect
the reputation he would earn as a Supreme Court Justice for
writing sarcastic, blistering, and sometimes even bombastic
dissents.
A few weeks after joining the bench, Judge Scalia issued
his first dissent—to an unpublished per curiam opinion.126 His
aggressive approach hinted at his future dissenting rhetoric. The
plaintiffs lacked standing, he reasoned, and the majority’s grant
of injunctive relief was not only misguided but also implicated
the separation of powers.127 Long-winded and pointedly critical
of the majority’s reasoning and conclusion,128 Judge Scalia’s
dissent reflected an acerbic wit.129
In his first full year as a circuit judge, Judge Scalia wrote
seven separate opinions—six dissents130 and an opinion
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125. President Reagan reportedly first offered the young Scalia a seat on the Seventh
Circuit, but he turned it down, hoping for an appointment to the more prestigious and
influential D.C. Circuit. JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL, THE LIFE AND
CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 80 (2009).
126. Covelo Indian Cmty. v. Watt, Nos. 82-2377, 82-2417, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS
23138, *37 (Dec. 21, 1982) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Why the opinion was not designated for
publication is not entirely clear; it appears only on LEXIS.
127. Id. at *51–*53.
128. Even when he concurred in the Court’s judgment, Justice Scalia’s minority
opinions were long. E.g., Walton v. Ariz., 497 U.S. 639, 656–74 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, taking eighteen printed pages to critique
the Court’s death-penalty jurisprudence along the way).
129. The last sentence was perhaps his most biting: “There is no justification in law or
in practicality for this court to ride to the assistance of an allegedly uninformed and
impotent Congress which will otherwise not be able, as it wishes, to help these plaintiffs.”
Covelo, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23138, at *53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1192–1200 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Ensign-Bickford Co. v. Occ. Safety & Health Rev.
Comm’n, 717 F.2d 1419, 1423–24 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steger v. Def.
Investigative Serv., 717 F.2d 1402, 1407–09 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Scalia,
J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984); United States v. Richardson, 702 F.2d 1079, 1086–94 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 468 U.S. 317 (1984); KCST-TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 699 F.2d 1185, 1195–
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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concurring in part and dissenting in part.131 While typically
verbose, they were for the most part temperate in tone and wellreasoned. Some reflected snippets of the Scalia wit,132 but few
reflected the vitriolic tone that would become the defining
characteristic of his opinions on the Supreme Court. And several
even included self-effacing clauses such as “it seems to me” and
“in my view,”133 acknowledging that his perspective might not
be the only correct one.
But perhaps Judge Scalia was emboldened when three of
his early dissents, each reflecting a spark of his later aggressive
tone, prompted Supreme Court reversals.134 In the first case, the
majority opinion granted double-jeopardy relief in an
interlocutory appeal. Judge Scalia dissented, warning that the
panel’s opinion “will bring the criminal law process into greater
public disrepute than the exclusionary rule, while at the same
time doing criminal defendants an evident injustice.”135 The
Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with him on jurisdiction but
resolving the case on other grounds.136
In the second—a challenge to the use of execution drugs
that the FDA had not yet approved—Judge Scalia’s tone was
more strident.137 The plaintiff inmates had unsuccessfully
petitioned the lower court to compel agency enforcement, and
the circuit panel granted relief.138 Judge Scalia’s dissent
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131. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1255–59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia,
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d, 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
132. See, e.g., Steger, 717 F.2d at 1407 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I dissent because I
believe the majority has applied a microscope to an inquiry which Congress meant to be
conducted with the naked eye.”).
133. E.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 698 F.2d at 1255 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I dissent from
the Court’s action in reversing the district court’s dismissal of the individual consumers,
who in my view were correctly found to lack standing.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at
1258 (“I prefer, therefore, to rest my disposition of this aspect of the case upon what seems
to me surer ground . . . .” (emphasis added)); Richardson, 702 F.2d at 1094 (Scalia,
MacKinnon & Bork, JJ., dissenting) (“In sum, the position adopted by the majority—that a
double jeopardy right ultimately exists, but a double jeopardy claim may not now be
asserted—seems to me wrong on both counts.” (emphasis added)).
134. Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1192–1200 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Watt, 703 F.2d at 622–27
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Richardson, 702 F.2d at 1086–94 (Scalia, MacKinnon & Bork, JJ.,
dissenting).
135. Richardson, 702 F.2d at 1086, 1094 (Scalia, MacKinnon & Bork, JJ., dissenting).
136. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984).
137. See Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1192–1200 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1192.
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139. Id. at 1198 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
141. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
142. Watt, 703 F.2d at 599 (Mikva, J., writing for the majority).
143. Id. at 622–27 (Scalia, MacKinnon & Bork, JJ., dissenting).
144. “That this should seem a bold assertion,” he wrote, “is a commentary upon how far
judicial and scholarly discussion of this basic constitutional guarantee has strayed from
common and common-sense understanding.” Id. at 622.
145. Id.
146. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294–95.
147. 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated on reh’g, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
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foreshadowed the sarcastic tone of his later Supreme Court
opinions: “[T]he sound which the majority heard was not an
anachronistic ring at all,” he wrote, “but the stifled cry of
smothered stare decisis, or perhaps the far-off shattering of wellestablished barriers separating the proper business of the
executive and judicial branches.”139 The Supreme Court later
reversed, holding that the agency’s failure to act on the inmates’
request was not judicially reviewable.140
The third case involved a permit for a days-long
demonstration held on National Park Service property where
camping was prohibited.141 The en banc court held that the
protestors engaged in expressive conduct by sleeping there in
makeshift tents to underscore the plight of the homeless, and the
agency’s regulation violated their First Amendment rights.142
Judge Scalia, joined by two other judges,143 took the position
that sleeping can never qualify as expressive conduct.144 He
declared that “to extend . . . protection [to] actions . . . conducted
for the purpose of ‘making a point’ is to stretch the Constitution
not only beyond its meaning but beyond reason, and beyond the
capacity of any legal system to accommodate.”145 The Supreme
Court later reversed, holding that the regulation was a
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction on the
demonstrators’ “symbolic conduct,” assuming (without
deciding) that sleeping can be a form of protected expression.146
In one early opinion, Judge Scalia revealed his capacity for
aggressive dissenting rhetoric. In Ramirez de Arellano v.
Weinberger,147 his cutting rhetoric first appeared in a majority
opinion written over a dissent. The plaintiffs, Honduras property
owners, sought to enjoin the United States from using their
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property for military purposes. Judge Scalia, mocking the
dissent, wrote that they failed to state a claim:
The dissent invokes “the great tradition of judicial
protection of individual rights against unconstitutional
governmental activities.” . . . But that tradition has not
come to us from La Mancha, and does not impel us to right
148
the unrightable wrong
by thrusting the sharpest of our
judicial lances heedlessly and in perilous directions. It
acknowledges the need to craft judicial protection in such
fashion as to preserve the proper functions of
149
government.

06/11/2018 08:46:58

148. See JOE DARION & MITCH LEE, The Impossible Dream, on MAN OF LA MANCHA
(Decca 1965) (including the lyric “[t]o right the unrightable wrong”).
149. Ramirez de Arellano, 724 F.2d at 156 (Scalia, J., writing for the majority).
150. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (Scalia, Bork & Starr, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113
(1985).
151. Id. at 1565–66 (Scalia, Bork & Starr, JJ., dissenting).
152. See Weinberger v. Ramirez de Arellano, 471 U.S. 1113, 1113 (1985) (mem.).
None of the biting Scalia rhetoric had any effect on the outcome.
153. See Ensign-Bickford Co., 717 F.2d at 1423–24 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steger, 717
F.2d at 1407–09 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Watt, 703 F.2d at 622–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
KCST-TV, Inc., 699 F.2d at 1195–201 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 698
F.2d at 1255–59 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154. See, e.g., Carter, 727 F.2d at 1246 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Assuming . . . that by
“discriminatory intent” the majority means an intent to discriminate on the basis of race,
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On rehearing, the en banc court vacated the panel opinion Judge
Scalia had written, and he could not resist attacking that decision
in dissent. “Even if it were the function of the federal courts to
create a system of shareholder rights for Fifth Amendment
purposes,” he wrote, “the system the majority has produced is
either a practical disaster or an analytic monstrosity.”150 And
then he took one last jab, characterizing the majority as having
“an inflated notion of the function of this court, which produces
stirring rhetoric but poor constitutional law.”151 Based on later
legislative developments, the Supreme Court vacated the en
banc decision.152
With these few exceptions, the opinions Judge Scalia wrote
in his first year on the bench were well-reasoned, temperate, and
judicial in tone.153 And the few separate opinions he issued over
the next three years generally reflected moderation, although
some were pointedly critical of the majority’s reasoning,154 and

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 60 Side A

06/11/2018 08:46:58

ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

6/4/2018 3:17 PM

DISRESPECTFUL DISSENT

227

one criticized the result sought by the plaintiffs as “far too
speculative to justify the exercise of judicial power.”155
But one 1984 case reflected Judge Scalia’s penchant for
acrimonious rhetoric. Survivors of those killed in an Antarctica
airplane crash sued the United States for wrongful death.
Whether they stated a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act
turned on whether Antarctica was a “foreign country.” The
panel held that it was not, allowing the claim.156
Judge Scalia’s twenty-five-page dissent began in an
exasperated tone. He attacked the majority for creating “venue
and choice-of-law solutions out of whole cloth” by rewriting the
statute instead of interpreting it.157 He also excoriated the
majority for relying on “the ever-congenial banquet of
legislative history (in the case of the FTCA, a banquet with
separate sittings in a number of years before it was finally
adopted in 1946).”158 And finally, he offered this biting and
sarcastic off-the-point aside:
I suppose it must be regarded as fortunate that the
majority’s decision to replace the choice-of-law rule of the
statute with those of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws . . . led to the District of Columbia in the present
case. But one must fear that the circumstances of the next
Antarctica case (or perhaps a revision of the Restatement)
will lead next time to the substantive law of the Soviet

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 60 Side A
06/11/2018 08:46:58

this is the most demonstrable illogic.”); see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 749 F.2d at 887
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ([The majority’s] notion of total preemption and cede-back has no
basis in reality.”); id. at 890 (“The majority has it precisely backwards . . . when . . . it in
effect applies a standard . . . to reach a conclusion regarding the meaning of the statutory
text.” (emphasis in original)); id. at 893 (“Legislative compromise (which is to say most
intelligent legislation) becomes impossible when there is no assurance that the statutory
words in which it is contained will be honored.”).
155. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d at 1345 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That opinion,
however, did not criticize the majority’s reasoning, or even the plaintiff’s motives—only
the result: “What we achieve today is not judicial vindication of private rights, but judicial
infringement upon the people’s prerogative to have their elected representatives determine
how [to apply] laws that do not bear upon private rights.” Id. at 1342.
156. Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 105–06 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
157. Id. at 112 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 115. In mocking language, Judge Scalia commended “the wisdom of the
English courts in refusing to attend these [legislative history] feasts.” Id. It would not be
long, however, before the English courts decided to partake of the very “feast” of which
Judge Scalia spoke so disparagingly. See Pepper v. Hart [1992] AC 593 (noting that
Parliament’s clear statements of purpose when enacting legislation may be consulted to
guide judicial interpretation).
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Union. If that happens, one wonders whether the
consequence will be to convert Antarctica (for purposes of
that case) into a “foreign country” (since foreign law would
then be applicable) with the result that the suit will be
dismissed; or rather to set the court off in search of another
nonjurisdiction to replace Restatement (Second), which will
perhaps once again lead to the United States substantive
law. I am tempted to confess that a decision which
produces such endlessly interesting ramifications cannot be
159
all bad.

After this long-winded, sarcastic dissent, Judge Scalia’s
separate opinions were shorter, more temperate, and generally
more self-effacing. It was almost as if someone had whispered
in his ear that if he ever hoped to be elevated to the Supreme
Court, he should consider toning down his discourse to reflect a
more judicial temperament.
B. Dissenting Discourse as Supreme Court Justice: 1986–1995

06/11/2018 08:46:58

159. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 130 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (Aug. 5–6, 1986), available at https://www.loc.gov/law/find/nominations/scalia/
hearing.pdf [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings] (Statement of Senator McConnell).
161. Id. at 23 (prepared Statement of Senator Denton (ellipsis in original)). Senator
Denton reported that Judge Scalia was “genuinely liked by his colleagues on the Court,
whether of liberal or conservative bent, and is very effective at forging coalitions between
those on all sides of the issue.” Id. Judge Scalia also received the American Bar
Association’s highest rating of “Well Qualified.” Id. at 113–17 (reproducing ABA letter of
August 5, 1986).
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At his Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Judge Scalia
was praised for his skill “in the arcane art of cogently drafting
judicial opinions.”160 One senator quoted an unnamed judge who
reported that Judge Scalia had a “combination of commitment
with vigor and an incisive, often wittily sarcastic, . . . style that
will rally the troops even if it never commands a majority of the
court.”161
One Senator, noting the frequency with which Supreme
Court Justices had been issuing separate opinions, expressed
“concern about the effect of these increasingly sharp public
disagreements on the collegiality of the Court.” Asked whether
separate opinions on the Supreme Court had “impeded the
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ability of either lawyers or judges to glean the reasoning to
support a particular decision,”162 Judge Scalia agreed that they
had. Then, acknowledging that he had not issued a “notable”
number of separate opinions as a circuit judge, he expressed
“hope” that he could exercise the self-restraint necessary to keep
from doing so if confirmed to the Supreme Court.163
Just eight years later, however, Justice Scalia’s separate
opinions had already earned him a reputation for his “quick
tongue and acerbic wit,” in some cases having “crossed the line
between lively language and impermissibly caustic speech.”164
But not all his early dissents fit this description. His first was
generally respectful in tone—perhaps because two other Justices
joined it.165 In the most pointed passage, he called it “fanciful”
for the Court to hold that a Connecticut primary statute
implicated the right of association as between Republican Party
members and independent voters.166 But otherwise the opinion
was well-reasoned, temperate, and brief. His second dissent,
joined only by Justice White, was twice as long as the first,167
but it too was generally temperate and well reasoned.
His third dissent, this time in an affirmative-action case,
was strikingly different.168 Justice Scalia ratcheted up the
rhetoric, reaching a degree of snarkiness that foreshadowed the
tone of many later opinions. He declared two passages in the
majority opinion “patently false,”169 used language about
women’s career aspirations that many would find demeaning,170
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 61 Side A
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162. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 160, at 46–47.
163. Id. at 47.
164. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 10, at 1077.
165. Tashjian v. Repub. Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 234–37 (1986) (Scalia, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., dissenting). In the same case, Justice Scalia also joined a
separate dissent authored by Justice Stevens. See id. at 230 (Stevens & Scalia, JJ.,
dissenting).
166. Id. at 235 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., dissenting). The word
“fanciful” appears regularly in Scalia dissents.
167. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 607–14 (1987) (Scalia &
White, JJ, dissenting).
168. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 657–77 (1987)
(Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J, dissenting.).
169. Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 671
(same).
170. Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]here
are, of course, those who believe that the social attitudes which cause women themselves to
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denigrated Court precedent,171 denounced an earlier case and
declared that it should be overruled,172 and ended on a dark note
of foreboding that warned of the injustices likely to flow from
the Court’s decision.173 All were characteristic of the disdainful,
exaggerated tone that would soon become his trademark.
The eleven dissents Justice Scalia authored during his first
term ranged from respectful and generally brief 174 to vitriolic
and lengthy.175 In between were sharply—even harshly—
worded dissents that focused on critiquing the Court’s reasoning
rather than attacking other Justices or undermining precedent.176
His last first-term dissent, however, was full of vituperative
rhetoric, accusing the Court of distorting the record and the
precedents, lacking any basis for its holding, engaging in
misguided reasoning, “boggl[ing] the mind,” making
“sweeping” assertions that were “contrary to reason and
experience,” and finally, reaching an “absurd” result.177 Perhaps
most alarming, this most disrespectful dissent was joined by
three other Justices whose opinions were typically temperate and
judicial in tone, as if Justice Scalia’s disrespectful rhetoric were
beginning to infect the rest of the Court.
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avoid certain jobs and to favor others are as nefarious as conscious, exclusionary
discrimination,” asserting that “there is assuredly no consensus on the point”).
171. Id. at 670–71 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 672–73 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 675–77 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting).
174. Booth v. Md., 482 U.S. 496, 519–21 (1987) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White &
O’Connor, JJ., dissenting); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 846–50 (1987)
(Scalia, J. dissenting); Gray v. Miss., 481 U.S. 648, 672–80 (1987) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist,
C.J., White & O’Connor, J.J., dissenting); Cal. Coastal, 480 U.S. at 607–14 (Scalia &
White, JJ., dissenting); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 234–37 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., &
O’Connor, J., dissenting).
175. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394–401 (1987) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J.,
White & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Rev.,
483 U.S. 232, 254–65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610–40 (1987) (Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657–77 (1987) (Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting,
& White, J., dissenting in part).
176. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303–06 (1987) (Scalia, J., &
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692–703 (1987)
(Scalia, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 235–38 (1987) (Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
177. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 394–401 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White & O’Connor, JJ.,
dissenting).
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The dissents Justice Scalia issued during his first term were
characteristic of those he would author during his next three
decades on the Supreme Court, except that he wrote solo
dissents more frequently over the years.178 And generally
speaking, his rhetoric became more biting. Many of his dissents
were well-reasoned, if long-winded, but Justice Scalia often
could not resist adding vitriol.
One 1988 dissent, for example, ended this way:
Today’s decision is a potential cornucopia of waste. Since
its reasoning cannot possibly be followed where it leads,
the jurisdiction of the Claims Court has been thrown into
chaos. On the other hand, perhaps this is the opinion’s
greatest strength. Since it cannot possibly be followed
where it leads, the lower courts may have the sense to
conclude that it leads nowhere, and to limit it to the single
179
type of suit before us.

Another was a thirty-seven-page dissent to an otherwise
unanimous opinion upholding a statute that authorized
appointment of an independent counsel to investigate criminal
allegations against government officials.180 Perhaps its most
memorable paragraph was about the allocation of power:
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178. While he wrote only one solo dissent in his first term, Justice Scalia wrote alone
more often as the years went on. In his second term, he authored three solo dissents; in his
third, two; in his fourth, one; and in his fifth, five. In many later terms, it was not unusual
for five of Justice Scalia’s dissents to be issued solely on his own behalf. In a typical term,
he wrote an average of ten dissents, although that number declined significantly between
1993 and 1995. One reason for the decline in those years might have been Justice
Thomas’s 1991 appointment, replacing Justice Marshall. The Court’s majority then shifted
to a more conservative perspective.
179. Bowen v. Mass., 487 U.S. 879, 930 (1988) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
180. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy took no part in this seven-to-one decision.
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That is what this suit is about. Power. The allocation of
power among Congress, the President, and the courts . . . .
Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court
clad, so to speak, in sheep’s clothing: the potential of the
asserted principle to effect important change in the
equilibrium of power is not immediately evident, and must
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be discerned by a careful and perceptive analysis. But this
181
wolf comes as a wolf.

Then he lectured his colleagues, accusing them of departing
from the Constitutional text, announcing the decision without
analysis, and abandoning “the government of laws that the
Constitution established,” instituting in its place a scheme that
“is not a government of laws at all.”182 He ended with
melodrama, criticizing the majority’s “ad hoc approach” to
constitutional adjudication that “is guaranteed to produce a
result, in every case, that will make a majority of the Court
happy with the law.”183 He preferred to “rely upon the judgment
of the wise men who constructed our system, and of the people
who approved it, and of two centuries of history that have shown
it to be sound.”184
Justice Scalia occasionally wrote with startling fervor. In a
case striking down a statute exempting religious periodicals
from a state tax, he began his dissent with this jarring rhetoric:
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181. Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia later referred to
his Morrison opinion as “my lonesome dissent.” Scalia, supra note 124, at 851. He also
called it the “most wrenching” case he had ever decided:
[I]t was wrenching not only because it came out wrong—I was the sole
dissenter—but because the opinion was written by Rehnquist, who had been
head of the Office of Legal Counsel, before me, and who I thought would realize
the importance of that power of the president to prosecute. And he not only
wrote the opinion; he wrote it in a manner that was more extreme than I think
Bill Brennan would have written it. That was wrenching.
Senior, supra note 97 (quoting Justice Scalia).
182. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 711–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 734 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Kapgan, supra note 6, at 79 (noting that
Scalia was “ever the one for drama”).
184. Id.
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As a judicial demolition project, today’s decision is
impressive. The machinery employed by the opinions of
Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun is no more
substantial than the antinomy that accommodation of
religion may be required but not permitted, and the bold but
unsupportable assertion . . . that government may not
“convey a message of endorsement of religion.” With this
frail equipment, the Court topples an exemption for
religious publications of a sort that expressly appears in the
laws of at least 15 of the 45 States that have sales and use
taxes . . . . I dissent because I find no basis in the text of the
Constitution, the decisions of this Court, or the traditions of
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our people for disapproving this longstanding and
185
widespread practice.

And he ended with this equally jarring rhetoric:
It is not right—it is not constitutionally healthy—that this
Court should feel authorized to refashion anew our civil
society’s relationship with religion, adopting a theory of
church and state that is contradicted by current practice,
186
tradition, and even our own case law. I dissent.

Justice Scalia even attacked Justices who wrote separate
concurring opinions. Consider, for example, his lengthy and
otherwise respectful dissent in McKoy v. North Carolina,187 in
which Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor joined.188 The vitriolic
footnotes in the dissent were pointedly directed at Justice
Blackmun and his concurring opinion, the last of them perhaps
the most strident:
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185. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29–30, 33 (1989) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist,
C.J., & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 45 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
188. Id. at 457–71 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice Blackmun believes that [the Court’s] grotesque
distortion of normal jury deliberations cannot be blamed
upon the rule the Court today announces, but is rather
North Carolina’s own fault, because the scheme it has
adopted represents “an extraordinary departure from the
way in which juries customarily operate.” . . . Typically, he
points out, juries “are . . . called upon to render unanimous
verdicts on the ultimate issues of a given case,” with “no
general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the
preliminary factual issues which underlie the
verdict.” . . . This is the sort of argument that causes state
legislators to pull their hair. A general verdict is of course
the usual practice. But it is this Court that has pushed the
States to special verdicts in the capital sentencing field. We
have intimated that requiring “the sentencing authority . . .
to specify the factors it relied upon in reaching its decision”
may be necessary to ensure . . . “that death sentences are
not imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner.” Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) . . . . Disparaging a
practice we have at least encouraged, if not indeed coerced,
gives new substance to the charge that we have been
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administering a “bait and switch” capital sentencing
189
jurisprudence.

And near the end of an otherwise temperate dissent in Grady v.
Corbin,190 Justice Scalia dropped these sarcastic comments—all
aimed at his colleagues—into a nearly two-page paragraph:
There are many questions here, and the answers to all of
them are ridiculous.
This delicious role reversal, discovered to have been
mandated by the Double Jeopardy Clause lo these 200
years, makes for high comedy but inferior justice.
If the judge initially decides that the previously prosecuted
offense “will not be proved” (whatever that means) he will
have to decide at the conclusion of the trial whether it “has
been proved” (whatever that means).
Even if we had no constitutional text and no prior case law
to rely upon, rejection of today’s opinion is adequately
supported by the modest desire to protect our criminal legal
system from ridicule.
[P]rosecutors confronted with the inscrutability of today’s
opinion will be well advised to proceed on the assumption
that the “same transaction” theory has already been
191
adopted. It is hard to tell what else has.

Toward the end of his time on the Court, Justice Scalia did
much the same thing in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry.192
After writing a generally well-reasoned dissent, he suddenly
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 63 Side B
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189. Id. at 470 n.5 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., dissenting).
190. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
191. Id. at 542–43 (Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Similar
passages appear in other Scalia dissents. See, e.g., Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U.S.
448, 469 (1998) (Scalia, O’Connor & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (referring to “ex post facto
legislative psychoanalysis”); Simmons v. S.C., 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (referring to “a whole new chapter in the ‘death-is-different’
jurisprudence which this Court is in the apparently continuous process of composing” and
the “Federal Rules of Death Penalty Evidence, so to speak, which this Court will
presumably craft (at great expense to the swiftness and predictability of justice) year by
year”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405, 419 (1991) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., &
Kennedy, J., dissenting) (characterizing Court’s approach as “backwards,” its method as
one that “psychoanalyzes Congress rather than reads its laws,” and its holding as
“poison[ing] the well of future legislation”); Minnick v. Miss., 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990)
(Scalia, J. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (referring to “a veritable fairyland castle of
imagined constitutional restriction”).
192. ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
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switched tone as he accused the Court of “announc[ing] a rule
that is blatantly gerrymandered to the facts,” dismissed one of
the Court’s conclusions as “[n]onsense,” criticized a step in the
Court’s analysis as “a leap worthy of the Mad Hatter,” asserted
that the Court “may as well jump from power over issuing
declaratory judgments to a monopoly on writing law-review
articles,” likened the foreign policy facilitated by the Court’s
decision to “that of a monarchy,” and predicted that the decision
would “erode the structure of separated powers that the People
established for the protection of their liberty.”193
In other dissents, Justice Scalia used melodramatic
language to ridicule the Court’s conclusion that a system of
political patronage could infringe on First Amendment rights,194
to contest its approval of closed-circuit testimony by child
victims of alleged abuse,195 to belittle the Court’s concerns about
unconstitutional racial discrimination in prosecutors’
peremptory strikes,196 to criticize the Court’s conclusions in a
search-and-seizure case,197 and to warn about the “destruction of
predictability” stemming from the Court’s interpretation of a
lien provision in the Bankruptcy Code. 198
Justice Scalia was prone to exaggeration as well as
melodramatic vitriol. In one case he accused the Court of
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193. Id. at 2121, 2123 (Scalia, J., Roberts, C.J., & Alito, J., dissenting).
194. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.,
& Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of making “its constitutional civil
service reform absolute”).
195. Md. v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting) (expressing worry about “subordination of explicit constitutional text to
currently favored public policy”).
196. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 426–31 (1991) (Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); see also Morgan v. Ill., 504 U.S. 719, 748–49, 752 (1992) (Scalia & Thomas,
JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing Court’s reasoning in a jury-selection case as
failing to pass “the most gullible scrutiny” and as making “a great leap over an
unbridgeable chasm of logic,” concluding that its holding was “grossly” offensive to the
Constitution).
197. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Hereafter a law-abiding citizen wrongfully arrested may be compelled to await the grace
of a Dickensian bureaucratic machine, as it churns its cycle for up to two days—never once
given the opportunity to show a judge that there is absolutely no reason to hold him, that a
mistake has been made.”).
198. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing
Court of “disregarding well-established and oft-repeated principles” and rendering them
“less secure and the certainty they are designed to achieve less attainable”).
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creating “a vast uncertainty in the law,” bound to yield a future
in which “the lawfulness and finality of no conviction or
sentence can be assured.”199 In a second, he challenged the
Court’s “revolutionary new doctrine of standing that will permit
the entire body of public civil penalties to be handed over to
enforcement by private interests.”200 In another he predicted
“years of litigation-driven confusion and destabilization” and
“judicially ordained turmoil” caused by the Court’s
“inscrutable” reasoning.201
A particularly striking example of Justice Scalia’s
disrespect for his judicial colleagues appeared in Lee v.
Weisman,202 an Establishment Clause case involving clergy
members invited to offer nonsectarian prayers at a public-school
graduation.203 Excerpts from his fifteen-page dissent are packed
with examples of his most inappropriate rhetoric:
In holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits
invocations and benedictions at public-school graduation
ceremonies, the Court . . . lays waste a tradition that is as
old as public-school graduation ceremonies themselves
. . . . As its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its
social engineering, the Court invents a boundless, and
boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion
. . . . Today’s opinion shows . . . why our Nation’s
protection, that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot
possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical
predilections of the Justices of this Court . . . .
The Court presumably would separate graduation
invocations and benedictions from other instances of public
“preservation and transmission of religious beliefs” on the
ground that they involve “psychological coercion.” I find it
a sufficient embarrassment that our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence regarding holiday displays . . . has come to
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199. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 133 (1991) (Scalia, White & Souter, JJ., &
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
200. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209
(2000) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
201. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 749, 751 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and
dissenting).
202. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
203. Id. at 586 (Kennedy, J., writing for the Court).

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 64 Side B

.....

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 65 Side A

06/11/2018 08:46:58

ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

6/4/2018 3:17 PM

DISRESPECTFUL DISSENT

237

“requir[e] scrutiny more commonly associated with interior
decorators than with the judiciary.” . . . But interior
decorating is a rock-hard science compared to psychology
practiced by amateurs. . . . [T]he Court has gone beyond the
realm where judges know what they are doing. The Court’s
argument that state officials have “coerced” students to take
part in the invocation and benediction at graduation
ceremonies is, not to put too fine a point on it, incoherent.
.....
The Court . . . does not say . . . that students are
psychologically coerced to bow their heads, place their
hands in a Dürer-like prayer position, pay attention to the
prayers, utter “Amen,” or in fact pray. (Perhaps further
intensive psychological research remains to be done on
these matters.)
.....
I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion
beyond acts backed by threat of penalty—a brand of
coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of us
who have made a career of reading the disciples of
Blackstone rather than of Freud.
.....

Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled
(so to speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that are
not derived from, but positively conflict with, our longaccepted constitutional traditions. Foremost among these
has been the so-called Lemon test . . . . Unfortunately,
however, the Court has replaced Lemon with its psychocoercion test, which suffers the double disability of having
no roots whatever in our people’s historic practice, and
being as infinitely expandable as the reasons for
psychotherapy itself.
.....
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Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if
religion were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some
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purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in
secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one’s room. For
204
most believers it is not that, and has never been.

Beyond their disrespectful rhetoric, exaggeration, and
melodrama, Scalia’s separate opinions were characteristically
verbose. He once added a twelve-page dissent in a case that even
he admitted was unimportant.205 Nevertheless, he took it upon
himself to lecture the majority for its errant methodology,
bluntly declaring it “an act of willpower rather than of
judgment.”206 He declared each part of the Court’s two-step
interpretive analysis “patently false”;207 criticized the majority
for failing to consult one of his favored dictionaries to interpret a
term’s “ordinary meaning,” instead relying on “fictitious”
dictionary support;208 and scolded it for “equat[ing] parole and
supervised release.”209 Then he moved on to a jurisprudence
lesson:
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204. Id. at 632–45 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting
(emphasis in original)).
205. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This is not an important case,
since it deals with the interpretation of a statute that has been amended to eliminate, for the
future, the issue we today resolve.”).
206. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 722 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do
not contend that the result the Court reaches is any way remarkable, only that it is not the
result called for by the statute.”).
207. Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 717, 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 725 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even on the rare occasions when Justice Scalia
wrote a concise dissent, he used negative rhetoric. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S.
40, 54 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (scolding Court for using a “recently invented
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[A]n institution that is careless in small things is more
likely to be careless in large ones; and an institution that is
willful in small things is almost certain to be willful in
large ones. The fact that nothing but the Court’s views of
policy and “congressional purpose” supports today’s
judgment is a matter of great concern, if only because of
what it tells district and circuit judges. The overwhelming
majority of the Courts of Appeals . . . reached the result
unambiguously demanded by the statutory text. . . .
Today’s decision invites them to return to headier days of
not-too-yore, when laws meant what judges knew they
210
ought to mean.
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Although the single dissent he authored in 1993 was
respectful, clear, and concise,211 Justice Scalia reverted to form
in 1994, writing an extraordinarily sarcastic dissent in a
paternity case challenging the use of peremptory strikes to
remove women from the jury:
Today’s opinion is an inspiring demonstration of how
thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we Justices are in
matters pertaining to the sexes (or as the Court would have
it, the genders), and how sternly we disapprove the male
chauvinist attitudes of our predecessors. The price to be
paid for this display—a modest price, surely—is that most
of the opinion is quite irrelevant to the case at hand. . . .
[T]he Court treats itself to an extended discussion of the
historic exclusion of women not only from jury service, but
also from service at the bar (which is rather like jury
service, in that it involves going to the courthouse a lot).
.....
Perhaps, however . . ., only the stereotyping of groups
entitled to heightened or strict scrutiny constitutes “the very
stereotype the law condemns”—so that other stereotyping
(e.g., wide-eyed blondes and football players are dumb)
remains OK.

.....

Justice Scalia’s dissent in a 1994 Establishment Clause case
challenging New York school district boundaries is remarkable

06/11/2018 08:46:58

requirement” that yielded “a propensity to error that make a scandal and a mockery of the
capital sentencing process”).
211. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241–47 (1993) (Scalia, Stevens & Souter,
JJ., dissenting). In addition to the Smith dissent, Justice Scalia wrote a 1993 opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part in Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 714–24
(1993) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also joined
dissenting and concurring opinions by other Justices.
212. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 156–57, 161, 163 (1994) (Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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In order . . . to pay conspicuous obeisance to the equality of
the sexes, the Court imperils a practice that has been
considered an essential part of fair jury trial since the dawn
of the common law. The Constitution of the United States
neither requires nor permits this vandalizing of our people’s
212
traditions.
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not only for its extreme sarcasm, but also for its insulting attacks
on fellow Justices and their separately expressed points of view,
repeatedly singling them out by name. The first paragraph is
instantly off-putting:
The Court today finds that the Powers That Be, up in
Albany, have conspired to effect an establishment of the
Satmar Hasidim. I do not know who would be more
surprised at this discovery: the Founders of our Nation or
Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum, founder of the Satmar. The
Grand Rebbe would be astounded to learn that after
escaping brutal persecution and coming to America with
the modest hope of religious toleration for their ascetic
form of Judaism, the Satmar had become so powerful, so
closely allied with Mammon, as to have become an
“establishment” of the Empire State. And the Founding
Fathers would be astonished to find that the Establishment
Clause . . . has been employed to prohibit characteristically
and admirably American accommodation of the religious
practices (or more precisely, cultural peculiarities) of a tiny
minority sect. I, however, am not surprised. Once this
Court has abandoned text and history as guides, nothing
prevents it from calling religious toleration the
213
establishment of religion.
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213. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 732 (1994)
(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
214. Id. at 734 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 751 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
216. Id.at 752 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 735 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 736 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
219. Id. at 735 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 738 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia then characterized the Court’s opinion and
reasoning as “misdescrib[ing]” precedent,214 “mislead[ing],”215
“astounding,”216
“astonishing[]”
and
“breathtaking,”217
218
“disfavoring of religion,” and “steamrolling . . . the difference
between civil authority held by a church and civil authority held
by members of a church.”219 He declared that the Court’s
analysis “could scarcely be weaker”220 and failed to “give the
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New York Legislature the benefit of the doubt.”221 He thought
the opinion was “preposterous,”222 pernicious,”223 “not a rational
argument,”224 and based on “the flimsiest of evidence.”225 This
was aggressive rhetoric, but Justice Scalia’s watershed year on
the Court was yet to come.
C. Dissenting Discourse as Supreme Court Justice: 1996–2016
Nearly all of Justice Scalia’s twelve 1996 dissents bore the
angry tone of someone who had expected to prevail, but was
unable to muster the votes to write for the majority.226 This
pattern continued through the next two decades of his dissenting
rhetoric,227 as might be best illustrated by the saga that began in
1996 and concluded with Obergefell v. Hodges228 in 2015.
The story begins with Romer v. Evans,229 in which the
Court struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment
preempting state or local laws protecting homosexuals against

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 67 Side A
06/11/2018 08:46:58

221. Id. at 740 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 735 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 737 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 741 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 752 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He went on to
criticize Justice Stevens for writing “less a legal analysis than a manifesto of secularism”
that “announces a positive hostility to religion,” id. at 749; Justice Kennedy for using
analysis that “founder[s] on its own terms,” id.; and Justice O’Connor for proposing no
replacement for the Lemon test so the Court would “no longer feel the need to even pretend
that our haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any principle,”
id. at 751 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
226. Ironically, the only respectful dissent that Justice Scalia filed in 1996 was one that
he wrote only for himself. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700–05 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. It is only fair to point out that Justice Scalia occasionally issued respectful
dissents, even in this period. E.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2466,
2479 (2015) (Scalia, J., Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). The Kingsley majority held
that a pretrial detainee could support an excessive-force claim by showing that “objectively
unreasonable” force had been used. Id. at 2473 (Breyer, J.). While Justice Scalia’s dissent
suggested that this conclusion rested on an “illogical” premise, it was otherwise respectful
and temperate. Id. at 2478 (Scalia, J., Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). But Scalia
dissents of this type became increasingly rare beginning in 1996.
228. ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Many other Scalia dissents would illustrate
the disturbing decline of this brilliant jurist’s discourse and his increasingly frequent
outbursts of frustration with the Court. But the Romer-to-Obergefell series makes the point.
229. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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230. Id. at 624 (quoting 1992 amendment to Colorado Constitution).
231. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
232. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (five-to-four decision), overruled by Lawrence v. Tex., 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
233. Id. at 196.
234. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 645 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 647, 651 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 653 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
241. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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discrimination.230 Justice Scalia’s excoriating dissent began this
way: “The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of
spite.”231 With characteristic prescience, he noted the apparent
conflict between Romer and Bowers v. Hardwick,232 decided a
decade earlier, which had upheld the constitutionality of a state
statute criminalizing sodomy.233 He accused the Romer majority
of placing the Court’s prestige behind the proposition that
opposing homosexuality was “as reprehensible as racial or
religious bias.”234 And he proclaimed that the Court had “no
business” imposing the elite values of its members—including
the belief that “animosity” toward homosexuals is “evil”—on all
Americans.235
Justice Scalia continued with spleen-venting outrage,
claiming that “[t]he Court’s portrayal of Coloradans as a society
fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled ‘gay-bashing’” was “so
false as to be comical.”236 He called the holding that the
Colorado amendment violated the federal Constitution “a
facially absurd proposition” that “frustrate[d] Colorado’s
reasonable effort to preserve traditional American moral
values.”237 And he accused the Court of inventing “a novel and
extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from
traditional forces” and of “verbally disparag[ing] as bigotry
adherence to traditional attitudes,”238 which was “nothing short
of insulting.”239 Finally, he called the decision an act “not of
judicial judgment, but of political will.”240
As Justice Scalia predicted, the Court overruled Bowers
seven years later in Lawrence v. Texas,241 a challenge to an antisodomy statute. Justice Scalia opened by feigning surprise that
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the Court had overruled Bowers, “rendered a mere 17 years
ago.”242 His first few paragraphs chastised the Court for
invoking stare decisis a decade earlier243 when refusing to
overrule Roe v. Wade244 and its “preservation of judicially
invented abortion rights,”245 while appearing to have no
compunction about overruling Bowers.246 Justice Scalia devoted
five pages to defending Bowers while chiding the majority for
selectively disregarding stare decisis.247 With characteristic
slippery-slope exaggeration, he claimed that overruling Bowers
would effect a social catastrophe.
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light
of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices.
Every single one of these laws is called into question by
today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the
scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding. . . .
What a massive disruption of the current social
248
order, therefore, the overruling of Bowers entails.
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242. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
243. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
244. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Casey, 539 U.S. at 853–60 (explaining considerations
against overruling Roe).
245. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 586–87 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 586–92 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 590–91 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 592 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t does not
surprise me . . . that the Court has chosen today to revise the standards of stare decisis set
forth in Casey. It has thereby exposed Casey’s extraordinary deference to precedent for the
result-oriented expedient that it is.”).
250. See id. at 593–94 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 597–98 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
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But then Justice Scalia conceded that he was not at all
surprised by the Court’s reasoning.249 He pointed out that the
Court had sidestepped the question whether homosexual sodomy
was a fundamental right, and had effectively conceded it was not
by applying the rational basis test.250 Next, he challenged the
majority’s reasoning that consensual homosexual relations
qualify as a constitutionally protected liberty interest based on
an “emerging awareness” of a right to privacy with respect to
adult sexual activity.251 Then he refuted the majority’s reasoning

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 68 Side B

06/11/2018 08:46:58

ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

244

6/4/2018 3:17 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

that Texas had no rational basis for singling out sodomy for
criminal penalties.252 “This proposition,” he wrote, “is so out of
accord with our jurisprudence—indeed, with the jurisprudence
of any society we know—that it requires little discussion,” and
he went on to explain the consequences of the Court’s error:
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of
its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are
“immoral and unacceptable,” . . . the same interest
furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy,
adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity. Bowers
held that this was a legitimate state interest. The Court
today reaches the opposite conclusion. . . . This effectively
253
decrees the end of all morals legislation.

He accused the Court of signing on to “the so-called homosexual
agenda,”254 and then warned of the coming apocalypse:

It would be a decade before Justice Scalia’s predicted
apocalypse threatened again in United States v. Windsor,256

Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
570 U.S. 744 (2013).
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Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional
law that has permitted a distinction to be made between
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate
state interest” for purposes of proscribing that conduct, . . .
and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of
neutrality), “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring,” . . . what justification could there possibly be for
denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples
exercising “[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution”? . . .
This case “does not involve” the issue of homosexual
marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and
logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.
Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us,
255
this is so.
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which challenged the Defense of Marriage Act.257 After the
Obama Administration’s Department of Justice declined to
defend the statute’s constitutionality, a group representing
Congress was permitted to intervene as an interested party.258
The Court held DOMA unconstitutional because its primary
purpose and effect were to treat a subset of state-sanctioned
marriages unequally.259
Justice Scalia dissented, his first paragraph setting the
derisive tone for the rest of his opinion:
This case is about power in several respects. It is about the
power of our people to govern themselves, and the power
of this Court to pronounce the law. Today’s opinion
aggrandizes the latter, with the predictable consequence of
diminishing the former. We have no power to decide this
case. And even if we did, we have no power under the
Constitution to invalidate this democratically adopted
legislation. The Court’s errors on both points spring forth
from the same diseased root: an exalted conception of the
260
role of this institution in America.
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257. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (defining “marriage” as “only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife,” and “spouse” as “only . . . a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife”).
258. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 754 (noting that the trial court, without opposition, had
granted permissive intervention to the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group).
259. Id. at 769–75.
260. Id. at 778 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 779 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 782 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 784 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Then, before reaching the merits, he characterized the Court’s
taking the case as “an assertion of judicial supremacy” that
“envisions a Supreme Court standing (or rather enthroned) at the
apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional
questions, always and everywhere ‘primary’ in its role.”261 He
called the case “a contrivance,”262
while deriding as
“incomprehensible” the Court’s conclusion that adversarial
aspects of Article III standing are “prudential” rather than
mandatory.263
But he did not stop there. He mocked the Court’s reasoning
as “wryly amusing,” and sarcastically asserted that “[r]elegating
a jurisdictional requirement to ‘prudential’ status is a wondrous
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device, enabling courts to ignore the requirement whenever they
believe it ‘prudent’—which is to say, a good idea.” And he
denigrated the Court’s cited authorities as falling “miles short of
supporting the counterintuitive notion that an Article III
‘controversy’ can exist without disagreement between the
parties.”264
Justice Scalia was so incensed and exasperated about the
jurisdictional implications that he was ready to incite a
constitutional showdown by which Congress might compel the
Executive Branch to comply with its will by defending DOMA:

Justice Scalia’s tone was no less biting when he turned to
the merits.266 He called the Court’s justification for its holding
“rootless and shifting,”267 accusing the majority of invoking the
“dread words ‘substantive due process’” as the basis for its
decision without expressly saying so.268 And then he criticized
the Court for making “only passing mention” of the arguments
Id. at 785 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 790–91 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 791 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 794 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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[I]f Congress cannot invoke our authority . . . then its only
recourse is to confront the President directly. Unimaginable
evil this is not. Our system is designed for
confrontation. . . . If majorities in both Houses of Congress
care enough about the matter, they have available
innumerable ways to compel executive action without a
lawsuit—from refusing to confirm Presidential appointees
to the elimination of funding. (Nothing says “enforce the
Act” quite like “. . . or you will have money for little else.”)
But the condition is crucial; Congress must care enough to
act against the President itself, not merely enough to
instruct its lawyers to ask us to do so. Placing the
Constitution’s entirely anticipated political arm wrestling
into permanent judicial receivership does not do the system
a favor. And by the way, if the President loses the lawsuit
but does not faithfully implement the Court’s decree, just as
he did not faithfully implement Congress’s statute, what
then? Only Congress can bring him to heel by . . . what do
you think? Yes: a direct confrontation with the
265
President.
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advanced by DOMA’s defenders, perhaps, he imagined,
“because it is harder to maintain the illusion of the Act’s
supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob
when one first describes their views as they see them.”269
Justice Scalia enumerated the Court’s specific words used
to describe the perceived motives of DOMA’s supporters, and
he declared (without further explanation) that he was “sure these
accusations [were] quite untrue.”270 He asserted that to defend
“traditional marriage” is not to demean those “who would prefer
other arrangements.”271 And then, in an abundance of irony
considering the habitual tone of his own separate opinions, he let
loose this remarkably hostile statement:
To hurl such accusations so casually demeans this
institution. In the majority’s judgment, any resistance to its
holding is beyond the pale of reasoned disagreement. To
question its high-handed invalidation of a presumptively
valid statute is to act (the majority is sure) with the
purpose to “disparage,” “injure,” “degrade,” “demean,” and
“humiliate” our fellow human beings, our fellow citizens,
who are homosexual. All that, simply for supporting an Act
that did no more than codify an aspect of marriage that had
been unquestioned in our society for most of its
existence—indeed, had been unquestioned in virtually all
societies for virtually all of human history. It is one thing
for a society to elect change; it is another for a court of law
to impose change by adjudging those who oppose it hostes
272
humani generis, enemies of the human race.

for today’s majority to assure us, as it is going out the door,
that a constitutional requirement to give formal recognition
to same-sex marriage is not at issue here—when what has
preceded that assurance is a lecture on how superior the
majority’s moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is
to the Congress’s hateful moral judgment against it. I
Id. at 796 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 797 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 797–98 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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But he was not quite done. He warned readers not to be
fooled by the majority’s “naked declaration” confining its
holding to same-sex couples who were already lawfully married
under state law. “It takes real cheek,” he wrote,
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promise you this: The only thing that will “confine” the
273
Court’s holding is its sense of what it can get away with.

Id. at 798 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 799 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 799–800 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 800 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 800-01 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 802 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia then issued his own string of insults to describe
the Court’s opinion: He claimed it was based on “scatter-shot
rationales . . . (federalism noises among them),” complete with
“disappearing trail[s] of . . . legalistic argle-bargle.”274 He
thought it “inevitable” that the Court would soon apply its
holding to invalidate state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage,
and even offered edited paragraphs of the majority’s opinion
(complete with striketype and italics) to demonstrate how easily
the Court could do just that.275 He speculated that the Court had
written these and many more passages to be “deliberately
transposable” to an opinion that would strike down state statutes
precluding recognition of same-sex marriages.276 “By formally
declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of
human decency,” he claimed, “the majority arms well every
challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional
definition.”277 And he predicted that “[t]he result will be a
judicial distortion of our society’s debate over marriage—a
debate that can seem in need of our clumsy ‘help’ only to a
member of this institution.”278 In the end, he conceded that the
issue was contentious, implicating complicated social and
political views on a “fundamental” matter, but he believed the
Court’s opinion “cheated both sides, robbing the winners of an
honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair
defeat.”279
Finally came Obergefell. This time the issue of whether
states could constitutionally refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages was squarely before the Court, as Justice Scalia had
been predicting since 2003. Justice Kennedy, who had written
the majority opinions in Lawrence and Windsor, once again
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wrote for the Court, holding that states were constitutionally
barred from refusing to recognize same-sex marriages.280
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the principal dissent, but
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito each dissented separately.281
Justice Scalia’s “blistering dissent”282 reflected his I-told-you-so
mood,283 declaring the Court’s decision “a threat to American
democracy.”284 As far as he was concerned, the answer to the
question before the Court was easy from the perspective of his
originalist constitutional jurisprudence.285 But Justice Scalia did
not stop after setting out this simple approach. Instead, he
mocked the Court’s suggestion that the freedom to marry
protects other freedoms as well, including those of intimacy,
expression, and spirituality. He expressed astonishment at “the
hubris reflected in today’s judicial Putsch.”286 Then,
demonstrating his outright disgust with the majority’s reasoning,
he quoted from the Court’s opinion. He even injected metathinking parentheticals into his dissent—as if they were bubble
thoughts in a comic strip:
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280. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
281. The four dissents span thirty-two pages. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–43.
Ironically, Chief Justice Roberts has repeatedly expressed his belief that the Court should
avoid splintered decisions. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Says He Backs
Consensus, Even If It Means Putting Off Issues for A Later Day, ABA J. DAILY NEWS
(May 26, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_says_he_backs_
consensus_even_if_it_means_putting_off_issues_f; Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATL.
(Jan.–Feb. 2007), https://www.the atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/3
05559/.
282. Cf. Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Ready for Prime Time—Group Dynamics, Dissent
and Intrigue: A Look at the Supreme Court, 1999–2000, 60 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15, 19
(Aug./Sept. 2000) (referring to Scalia’s earlier “blistering dissent (does he write any other
kind?)” in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 461 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Justice Scalia’s Obergefell dissent was certainly blistering in tone. See, e.g., Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The [majority] opinion is couched in a style that
is as pretentious as its content is egotistic.”).
283. Justice Scalia himself used this phrase in his dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914, 945–46 (2000), in which the Court struck down a Nebraska statute banning an
abortion procedure. Id. at 955 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
284. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
285. Id. at 2628 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (noting that “[w]hen the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one
woman,” and asserting that the Court had “no basis for striking down a practice that is not
expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s text”).
286. Id. at 2629 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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287. Id. at 2630 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes omitted; parentheses,
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It is one thing for separate concurring or dissenting
opinions to contain extravagances, even silly
extravagances, of thought and expression; it is something
else for the official opinion of the Court to do so. Of course
the opinion’s showy profundities are often profoundly
incoherent. “The nature of marriage is that, through its
enduring bond, two persons together can find other
freedoms,
such
as
expression,
intimacy,
and
spirituality.” (Really? Who ever thought that intimacy and
spirituality [whatever that means] were freedoms? And if
intimacy is, one would think Freedom of Intimacy is
abridged rather than expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest
hippie. Expression, sure enough, is a freedom, but anyone
in a long-lasting marriage will attest that that happy state
constricts, rather than expands, what one can prudently
say.) Rights, we are told, can “rise . . . from a better
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives
define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” (Huh?
How can a better informed understanding of how
constitutional imperatives [whatever that means] define
[whatever that means] an urgent liberty [never mind], give
birth to a right?) And we are told that, “[i]n any particular
case,” either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause
“may be thought to capture the essence of [a] right in a
more accurate and comprehensive way,” than the other,
“even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification
and definition of the right.” (What say? What possible
“essence” does substantive due process “capture” in an
“accurate and comprehensive way”? It stands for nothing
whatever, except those freedoms and entitlements that this
Court really likes. And the Equal Protection Clause, as
employed today, identifies nothing except a difference in
treatment that this Court really dislikes. Hardly a distillation
of essence. If the opinion is correct that the two clauses
“converge in the identification and definition of [a] right,”
that is only because the majority’s likes and dislikes are
predictably compatible.) I could go on. The world does not
expect logic and precision in poetry or inspirational popphilosophy; it demands them in the law. The stuff
contained in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s
287
reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis.
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To many, this was perhaps the most offensive passage in Justice
Scalia’s extraordinarily offensive dissent.288
But Justice Scalia did not stop there. In a footnote, he
leveled an unusually pointed, sarcastic attack on the Court’s
reasoning:
If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined
an opinion for the Court that began: “The Constitution
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a
lawful realm, to define and express their identity,” I would
hide my head in a bag. The Supreme Court of the United
States has descended from the disciplined legal reasoning
of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical
289
aphorisms of the fortune cookie.

And in characteristic fashion, Justice Scalia felt compelled to
leave the reader with a ringing, memorable, and quotable phrase:
With each decision of ours that takes from the People a
question properly left to them—with each decision that is
unabashedly based not on law, but on the “reasoned
judgment” of a bare majority of this Court—we move one
290
step closer to being reminded of our impotence.

III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENTS
The voice of the majority may be that of force triumphant,
content with the plaudits of the hour, and recking little of

06/11/2018 08:46:58

ellipses, brackets, and emphasis in original).
288. See, e.g., Eric Levitz, Five Unexpected Arguments in Scalia’s Same-Sex Marriage
Dissent, MSNBC.COM (June 26, 2015 5:00 PM EDT), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/fiveunexpected-arguments-scalias-dissent (describing dissent as “brimming with vitriolic
snark” and responding to its analysis).
289. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 n.22 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
290. Id. at 2631 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
291. Justice Scalia had nine children and often joked in interviews that he had lost track
of how many grandchildren he had.

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 72 Side A

Of course, Justice Scalia could not have known that his
Obergefell dissent would be among the last of his injudicious
dissents. But we know that now. Regrettably, his many
descendants will someday look through the United States
Reports and read the intemperate words written by their
ancestor.291 What will they think of his legacy?
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the morrow. The dissenter speaks to the future, and his
voice is pitched to a key that will carry through the
years.292

A. The Law Without Justice Scalia
The extent of Justice Scalia’s influence will not be known
for generations,293 although some already predict that “the
enduring form” of his written opinions offers “the potential to
shape doctrines and decisions in the near and distant future.”294
The Justice himself once confessed his hope that “at least some”
of his dissents would someday become majority opinions.295 Yet
years later, he professed to care little about his legacy.296
Justice Ginsburg recently observed that the Supreme Court
has changed since Justice Scalia’s death, reporting that “the
Court is a paler place without our lively Justice Scalia.”297 Even
Justice Stevens, who often disagreed with Justice Scalia on
constitutional issues, remembered him for his friendship and
spontaneous sense of humor.298 Others found him engaging and
personable,299 sometimes even “charming and . . . riotously
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292. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND
ADDRESSES 36 (1931).
293. E.g., SCALIA’S COURT: A LEGACY OF LANDMARK OPINIONS AND DISSENTS 19
(Keven A. Ring ed., 2016).
294. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
295. Scalia, supra note 124, at 864.
296. Senior, supra note 97 (“But I have never been custodian of my legacy. When I’m
dead and gone, I’ll either be sublimely happy or terribly unhappy.”). Asked which of his
decisions he thought posterity would view as “heroic,” Justice Scalia responded, “Oh, my
goodness. I have no idea. You know, for all I know, 50 years from now I may be the
Justice Sutherland of the late-twentieth and early-21st century, who’s regarded as: ‘He was
on the losing side of everything, an old fogey, the old view.’ And I don’t care.” Id.
297. Ginsburg Conversation, supra note 29, at 1499.
298. John Paul Stevens, J., Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (ret.), Some Thoughts About a Former
Colleague at 2–3 (Apr. 25, 2016), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/JPS%20Speech%20Washington%20University%20in%20St%20Louis%20Schoo
l%20of%20Law_04-25-2016.pdf. Justice Stevens noted then that “Nino’s friendship with
his colleagues, including both those who disagreed with his views and those who more
regularly shared his views, is legendary.” Id. at 3.
299. E.g., John G. Browning, The Justice Scalia I Knew, 79 TEX. B.J. 294, 294 (2016).
(characterizing the private Scalia as “a witty, engaging person with the courtly manners of
an Old World gentleman and a singular devotion to his large family”).
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funny.”300 But how have his separate opinions influenced and
shaped the law?301
While Justice Scalia’s dissents were frequently cited for
their colorful rhetoric, especially in the popular press,302 the very
fact that they were dissents demonstrates that he often fell short
of persuading his colleagues to accept his reasoning.303 During
his lifetime, a majority of the Court would embrace only a
handful of the hundreds of dissenting opinions the Justice
personally authored.304 And while Justice Scalia claimed to
write his dissents for “law students,”305 that begs the question of
their lasting value as instruments of persuasion.
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300. Dahlia Lithwick, Justice Grover Versus Justice Oscar: Scalia and Breyer Sell
Very Different Constitutional Worldviews, SLATE (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/12/justice_grover_versus_justice_oscar.html.
Lithwick analogized Justice Breyer to a “jurisprudential Grover—sweet and optimistic and
eager-to-please— . . . confident he’ll sell us on his constitutional theory, one lawyer at a
time. And Antonin Scalia’s constitutional Oscar the Grouch—frustrated and
misunderstood, yet somehow more lovable for it—doesn’t even try to close the deal. He
doesn’t need us to vindicate him. He’s confident history will do that.” Id.
301. The following analysis uses the categorization of Scalia opinions by Cornell’s
Legal Information Institute. See Writings by Justice Scalia Grouped by Type, LII.COM,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/scalia.dec.html (reporting 338 majority and
plurality opinions, 385 concurring opinions, 270 dissents, and forty-eight opinions
concurring in part and dissenting in part, for a total of 1,041).
302. E.g., Michael S. Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia’s Sermonette, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 863, 863 (1997) (referring to “flamboyant judicial rhetoric and colorful
writing” that “make headlines” and terming Scalia “the master of the eminently quotable
turn-of-phrase, the arresting quip, the provocatively expressed legal argument”).
303. Kapgan, supra note 6, at 97.
304. The author’s independent analysis reveals that only six of the many dissents
Justice Scalia personally authored eventually commanded a majority during his lifetime.
See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011), overruled by Johnson v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Scalia, J.); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007),
overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551; Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled
by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (Scalia, J.); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310 (2010); S.C. v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tenn.,
501 U.S. 808 (1991); Booth v. Md., 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S.
808. In none of the six overruled cases was Justice Scalia the lone dissenter. And four were
overruled in the same two opinions, reducing the issues on which his dissenting opinions
have yet prevailed to just four. (The research and analysis supporting the conclusions
reported in this note are on file with the author.)
305. Lithwick, supra note 300 (reporting that Justice Scalia “writes his dissents for the
case books,” and concluding that, while it might be too late to convince lawyers, “he’s still
hoping to win over the law students”); Senior, supra note 97 (reporting that Justice Scalia
wrote for law students because “they will read dissents that are breezy and have some
thrust to them”); see Scalia, supra note 5, at 39 (“In our law schools, it is not necessary to
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The frequency of Justice Scalia’s dissents306 demonstrates
his reluctance to follow—or perhaps failure to appreciate—
Justice Brennan’s all-important “Rule of Five.”307 Indeed,
“persuading his colleagues [was] not . . . one of Scalia’s
strengths—or even an objective with which his style seem[ed]
concerned.”308 What, then, does he leave behind?
B. Justice Scalia’s Judicial Perspectives
Beyond his love of the battle in judicial decisionmaking
and his use of sarcasm and scorn as rhetorical aids, Justice
Scalia was well known for four judicial perspectives. He was a
constitutional originalist. He was a statutory textualist who
objected to the use of legislative history as an aid to resolving
statutory ambiguities. But he regularly consulted dictionaries
when interpreting statutory language. And he was generally a
strong proponent of judicial deference to agency interpretation.
In each of these areas, Justice Scalia’s speeches, books, articles,
and opinions shaped the law by influencing the philosophies that
courts draw upon, even though the bulk of his dissents have
failed to carry the day.
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assign students the writings of prominent academics [to explain] the principal controversies
of legal method or of constitutional law. Those controversies appear in the opposing
opinions of the Supreme Court itself, and can be studied from that text.”).
306. The only other member of the Court to write more dissents than Justice Scalia was
Justice Stevens, who was well known as a prolific writer. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The
Dissenter: Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2007), https://www.nytimes
.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html (noting that Justice Stevens “files more
dissents and separate opinions than any of his colleagues”).
307. Justice Brennan “famously used to tell his law clerks that the most important ‘law’
at the Supreme Court was the ‘Rule of Five.’ He would constantly remind them that it takes
five justices for the court to reach a decision and they should never forget it.” Eric Segall,
Supreme Court Justices Are Not Really Judges, SLATE (Nov. 14, 2014), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/11/supreme_court_justices_
are_not_judges_they_rule_on_values_and_politics_not.html; see also ADAM WINKLER,
GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 273 & n.17 (2013)
(telling the story in more detail).
308. Kapgan, supra note 6, at 97; but see Autumn Fox & Stephen R. McAllister, An
Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223,
225 (1997) (“It may be . . . that Scalia’s failure to build a consensus on the Court will, in
the end, matter very little. Instead, it is his intellect, his legal principles, and his writing
ability that will be his legacy to the Court.”).
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1. Constitutional Originalism
Justice Scalia was especially well known for his views
about constitutional interpretation. He believed that
constitutional language should be interpreted in historical
context to grasp how the Framers intended their written words to
be understood.309 He rejected the view that the Constitution is a
living, evolving document to be interpreted consistent with
changing times.310 He sometimes quipped that his originalist
philosophy treated the Constitution as if it were “dead,” but he
preferred to call it “enduring.”311
The Court’s recent decisions suggest that most Justices are
prepared to interpret the Constitution so that it remains relevant
to a changing culture. And even Justice Scalia was willing to
bend on occasion, at least with respect to the impact of modern
technology on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.312 The
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309. Michael D. Ramsey, Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia’s Originalism in Practice, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1945 (2017) (referring to Justice Scalia as “the leading
judicial theorist and advocate of originalism of his era”); see Scalia, supra note 124, at
862–64 (explaining his support for constitutional originalism despite its faults, but
conceding that “in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine . . .
upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging”).
310. Scalia, supra note 124, at 853–56 (identifying and criticizing scholars he
considered “non-originalists”).
311. “The Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living but dead, or as I prefer to
call it, enduring. It means today not what current society, much less the court, thinks it
ought to mean, but what it meant when it was adopted.” All Things Considered:
Originalism: A Primer on Scalia’s Constitutional Philosophy (Nat’l Public Radio broadcast
Feb. 14, 2016), available at http://www.npr.org/2016/02/14/466744465/originalism-aprimer-on-scalias-constitutional-philosophy (quoting Justice Scalia). During a 2006 debate
with Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia explained originalism more colorfully. He objected
when the moderator asked whether he thought the so-called “living Constitution” was
“idiotic”: “‘You are misquoting me. . . . I was describing the argument in favor of the
living Constitution—that it’s a living organism that must grow or become brittle and
snap. . . . That is idiotic.’” Lithwick, supra note 300 (quoting Justice Scalia). He wondered
aloud how “a Constitution that clearly allowed for the death penalty now explicitly
prohibit[s] it.” Id. “‘That’s the living Constitution I am talking about, and it’s the one I
wish would die.’” Id.
312. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (opining
that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” and
holding that use of heat-sensing technology outside defendant’s home to detect possible
marijuana-growing operation inside amounted to Fourth Amendment search).
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ultimate fate of Justice Scalia’s originalism depends on the
jurisprudence of his successors, including Justice Gorsuch.313
2. Statutory Textualism and Disregard of Legislative History
Justice Scalia was the leading textualist of his era. He
believed that judges should focus on the text of a statute rather
than extrinsic sources of meaning.314 While there is nothing new
about beginning the task of statutory interpretation with the
“plain language,”315 Justice Scalia would also end with the
text.316 He explained his method this way:
The exclusive reliance on text when interpreting text is
known as textualism. . . . [T]his approach elicits both better
drafting and better decision-making. . . . Textualism, in its
purest form, begins and ends with what the text says and
fairly implies. Its principal tenets have guided the
interpretation of legal texts for centuries. . . . Textualism is
not well designed to achieve ideological ends, relying as it
does on the most objective criterion available: the accepted
contextual meaning that the words had when the law was
317
enacted.
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313. During his confirmation hearings, Judge Gorsuch testified that he considered
himself a constitutional originalist, but he thought his approach could keep pace with the
modern world. Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch, to be an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary 115th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 21, 2017), available at https://congressional.proquest.com/congress
ional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?accountid=147014&groupid=1087361&pgId
=b5531681-2674-401c-993c-55f861bf4043&rsId=1628CC1E0A7 (“And what I would say
is the Constitution doesn’t change, the world around us changes and we have to understand
the Constitution and apply it in light of our current circumstances.” (responding to question
from Senator Klobuchar)).
314. See Antonin Scalia, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws 92 (Mar. 8–9, 1995), available at https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-toz/s/scalia97.pdf (“It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver . . . . Men may
intend what they will; but . . . only the laws that they enact bind us.”). In his early years on
the bench, Justice Scalia consulted legislative history on occasion, but as time went on he
refused to consider it at all. Eventually, he declined to join any part of an opinion that
discussed legislative history. Morrison, supra note 89, at 16.
315. E.g., Lake Cnty. v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 671 (1889) (noting that “when the words
of a man express his meaning plainly, distinctly, and perfectly, we have no occasion to
have recourse to any other means of interpretation”).
316. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER: READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012).
317. Id.
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Justice Scalia’s textualist approach did not mean that he
was necessarily a strict constructionist—in fact, he disclaimed
that characterization.318 On the other hand, his rigid textualist
approach to statutes is difficult to reconcile with his embrace of
constitutional originalism. He once explained the challenges of
the originalist approach, which include researching the historical
context of constitutional language and consulting extrinsic
documents, including the ratification records of state
legislatures,319 all analogous to legislative history.
A survey concluded a decade ago that the federal appellate
courts had not yet “bought” Justice Scalia’s position that
legislative history is “per se inauthentic.”320 But the influence of
his skepticism was both “discernible” and “significant” to some
observers, who suggested that his cautious approach to
legislative history might be his “most lasting influence.”321
Justice Scalia once speculated that although he might not win on
originalism,322 he had made progress in persuading fellow
justices against the use of legislative history.323 Be that as it
may, he certainly “narrow[ed] the battlefield.”324
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318. Scalia, supra note 314, at 98 (“[S]o-called strict constructionism . . . is a degraded
form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. I am not a strict
constructionist, and no one ought to be—though better that, I suppose, than a
nontextualist.”).
319. Scalia, supra note 124, at 856–57. At least one scholar has aptly questioned how
the rejection of legislative history as an authoritative source of statutory meaning can be
reconciled with constitutional originalism. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme
Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History? 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1301, 1302 (1998) (“[T]he new textualists, particularly Justice Scalia, refuse to consider
the debating history of statutes as relevant context but do consider such history of the
Constitution and its amendments, sometimes in great detail.”).
320. JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY? JUSTICE SCALIA IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 100 (2007) (recognizing that “Justice Scalia has
repeatedly inveighed against the use of legislative history in cases where the statute is
unambiguous”); see also Morrison, supra note 89, at 16.
321. GERKEN, supra note 319, at 14; see also id. at 319–20.
322. See Robert Schapiro, Justice Antonin Scalia: More Quotable Than Influential,
CONVERSATION (Feb. 15, 2016 10:31 PM EST), http://theconversation.com/justice-antoninscalia-more-quotable-than-influential-54721 (noting that Justice Scalia’s “attempt to
reorient interpretation of the Constitution . . . failed to achieve lasting success”).
323. Senior, supra note 97 (reporting Justice Scalia’s 2013 statement that the Court then
paid “much more attention to the words of a statute” and “much less [to] legislative
history” than did “opinions from the eighties, . . . two thirds of [which] were discussing
committee reports and floor statements and all that garbage,” a change he believed he had
helped influence); but see Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia’s Fading Legacy, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/opinion/justice-antonin-scalia-legacy
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3. Dictionaries as Legal Authority
Compared to his penchant for textualism and his disdain for
legislative history, considerably less has been written about
Justice Scalia’s fondness for what might be called dictionary
shopping.325 The Court has long consulted lay dictionaries to
determine the ordinary meaning of terms not otherwise defined
in the statute.326 But to a greater degree than any other Justice in
history, Justice Scalia routinely referred to dictionary
definitions,327 which led to a striking increase in the Court’s use
of dictionaries after he was appointed in 1986.328
The Scalia-initiated trend of relying on dictionaries as
interpretive authority is cause for concern. Dictionaries do not
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.html (noting two years after Justice Scalia’s death that Justices “now feel free to invoke
legislative history,” and no longer feel obligated “to defend or even explain” its use);
Schapiro, supra note 322 (noting that Justice Scalia changed “how advocates and judges
talk about statutes, but not how they ultimately interpret them”).
324. Morrison, supra note 89, at 16.
325. To illustrate, Justice Scalia once devoted three full pages and two lengthy
footnotes to explaining the petitioners’ mistake in relying on Webster’s Third International
Dictionary to interpret the statutory term “modify.” MCI Telecomm’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–28 & nn.2, 3 (1994) (Scalia, J.). He focused on the word’s
alternative definitions in Webster’s Third—“to make minor changes” or “to make a basic
or important change”—which “contradict[ed] [the more narrow definition in] virtually all
others.” Id. at 225–26 (citing just four dictionaries, including Webster’s Third).Conceding
that he might be “gilding the lily,” he noted that in 1934, when the controlling statute was
enacted, “the most relevant time for determining a statutory term’s meaning, . . . Webster’s
Third was not yet even contemplated.” Id. at 228. Instead, he cited the 1934 edition
(Webster’s Second) and yet another dictionary published in 1993 in declaring that the Court
had “not the slightest doubt that [moderate change] is the meaning the statute intended.” Id.
at 227.
326. See, e.g., Nix. v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306–07 (1893). “There being no evidence
that the words . . . have acquired any special meaning . . ., they must receive their ordinary
meaning. Of that meaning the court is bound to take judicial notice . . . and upon such a
question dictionaries are admitted . . . as aids to the memory and understanding . . . .” Id.
327. See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483,
495 (2013) (noting that the number of opinions consulting dictionaries more than doubled
between 1986 and 2011); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has
Become A Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 227, 261 (1999) (analyzing Court’s dictionary use during Justice Scalia’s first twelve
terms).
328. See, e.g., J. Gordon Christy, A Prolegomena to Federal Statutory Interpretation:
Identifying the Sources of Interpretive Problems, 76 MISS. L.J. 55, 66 (2006) (noting the
irony that “we are treated to the truly absurd spectacle of august justices and judges arguing
over which unreliable dictionary and which unreliable dictionary definition should be
deemed authoritative” (footnote omitted)).
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reflect the only—or even the best—meaning of a term as used in
ordinary American English.329 One of the disputes surrounding
the 1961 publication of Webster’s Third International
Dictionary, for example, was whether a lay dictionary should
describe how words are actually used or instead prescribe how
they should be used.330 Contrary to Justice Scalia’s justifications
for consulting dictionaries to discover the ordinary meaning of a
word, many traditional lay dictionaries were compiled by editors
who focused more on preserving correct usage than on
describing how ordinary Americans then used and understood
words.331
More important, consulting dictionaries to interpret
statutory meaning assumes that statutes are drafted with ordinary
dictionary definitions in mind. If this were so, Congress could be
expected to draft a statutory definition for any term it intends to
carry a specific or unusual meaning. But research does not
support that implicit hypothesis.332 Legislative drafters may in
fact lack access to authoritative dictionaries, or simply fail to
consult them.333 And the time pressure of the legislative
process334 may mean that drafters have no opportunity to consult
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329. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ.
L. REV. 77, 95 & n.84 (2010) (noting scholarly criticism of dictionaries for inaccuracy).
330. Id. at 96. Justice Scalia demonstrated a clear preference for Webster’s Second. Id.
at 96–97 (explaining than since 2000, Justice Scalia had cited Webster’s Second in twelve
cases, but Webster’s Third only “discriminatingly.”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 213 (2008)
(recommending several dictionaries).
331. Brudney & Baum, supra note 327, at 489 (noting that Justice Scalia favored
Webster’s Second and the American Heritage Dictionary, which lexicographers consider
prescriptive); see also id. at 507–08 (distinguishing prescriptive dictionaries from
descriptive).
332. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 938 (2013) (reporting that some survey respondents “specifically
referenced Justice Scalia—acknowledging that the Court frequently uses dictionaries but
noting that they remain mostly irrelevant to the drafting process,” including one drafter
who “said while laughing that ‘Scalia is a bright guy, but no one uses a freaking
dictionary’”).
333. Id. at 907, 930, 934. Gluck and Bressman also reported that “[m]ore than 50% of
our respondents said that dictionaries are never or rarely used when drafting,” id. at 938,
and that “[o]nly 15% said dictionaries were always or often used,” id. at 938 n.111.
334. See, e.g., Jim Tankersley & Alan Rappeport, A Hasty, Hand-Scribbled Tax Bill
Sets Off an Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/
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a library of dictionaries to ensure that undefined statutory terms
convey the “ordinary meaning” that a Court might attach after
consulting a host of lay dictionaries.
4. Administrative Deference
By the time he became a judge, Justice Scalia was already
an expert on administrative law.335 He previously chaired the
Administrative Conference of the United States336 and led the
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.337 As a Justice
he strongly supported Chevron deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes.338 In 2001, for example,
he wrote a visceral dissent when the Court held that informal
agency interpretations were not necessarily entitled to Chevron
deference, but should be assessed according to a variety of
factors.339
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politics/hand-scribbled-tax-bill-outcry.html (quoting Senator’s concern that a major taxoverhaul bill received just before a vote “literally ha[d] hand scribbled policy changes on
it”).
335. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 5
REGULATION 25 (July-Aug. 1981).
336. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Comm. & Admin. Law, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 24 (May 20, 2010) (prepared Statement of the
Honorable Antonin Scalia), available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/Breyer%2520and%2520Scalia%2520Testimony _ May%25202010%2520Congressional %
2520Hearing_0.pdf; see also Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Antonin Scalia, https://www.acus
.gov/contacts/antonin-scalia. Later he was a senior fellow of the Conference. Id.
337. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 160, at 1 (statement of Senator Thurmond,
noting that Judge Scalia’s experience included serving as “assistant attorney general for the
Office of Legal Counsel”).
338. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see
also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 10 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 118, 119–22 (1990) (explaining and defending Chevron
deference); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 511–14 (1989) (same); but cf. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d
1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron . . . permit[s] executive
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and
concentrate federal power in a way . . . difficult to square with the Constitution of the
framers’ design.”).
339. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239–61 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 261 (“I dissent even more vigorously from the reasoning that produces the
Court’s judgment, and that makes today’s decision one of the most significant opinions
ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative action. Its
consequences will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad.”).

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 77 Side A

06/11/2018 08:46:58

ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

DISRESPECTFUL DISSENT

6/4/2018 3:17 PM

261

Just as Justice Scalia’s position on legislative history
evolved, so did his administrative-deference jurisprudence. In
1997, he had written for a unanimous Court in Auer v.
Robbins340 that the Labor Department had discretion to interpret
its own ambiguous regulations. First, he deferred to the agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous controlling statute under
Chevron, finding it not “unreasonable.”341 But then, turning to
the agency’s interpretation and application of its own ambiguous
regulation, he reasoned that the Secretary’s interpretation
controlled unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation’s language. After consulting two lay dictionaries,
Justice Scalia decided that it was neither.342
Auer has been criticized by courts,343 by scholars,344 and
even by Justice Scalia himself.345 Beginning in 2011, he dropped
increasingly direct hints that Auer warranted reconsideration, if
not outright overruling.346 The majority refused to go along. And
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340. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
341. Id. at 458.
342. See id. at 461.
343. E.g., Elgin Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 718
F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2013) (refusing to extend Auer because “[a]ffording deference to
agency interpretations of ever more ambiguous regulations would allow the agency to
function not only as judge, jury, and executioner but to do so while crafting new rules”).
344. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency
Actions Mean? 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011) (concluding that the Auer Court seemed
to be messaging lower courts to give “extraordinary deference” to “agency interpretations
of agency rules”); see also John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 696 (1996)
(critiquing Seminole Rock, on which Auer relied); but cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 306–07 (2017)
(defending Auer).
345. See infra note 346 (citing Justice Scalia’s separate opinions criticizing Auer).
Justice Thomas reportedly recalled hearing Justice Scalia once remark, “in typical Nino
fashion, that one of our opinions that had become an important precedent was . . . ‘Just a
horrible opinion, one of the worst ever.’ I thought briefly about what he had said, and
whispered ‘Nino, you wrote it.’” Aaron L. Nielson, Cf. Auer v. Robbins, 21 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 303, 305 (2017); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 344, at 299 (noting that Justice
Scalia was “both Auer’s author and (late in his career) its leading judicial critic”).
346. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would . . . restore the balance originally struck by the
[Administrative Procedure Act] with respect to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations . . . by abandoning Auer and applying the Act as written.”); see also Decker v.
Nw. Envt’l Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that “it is
time” for reconsideration of Auer); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67–
68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing “increasing[] doubt[]” about Auer’s validity).
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soon after Justice Scalia died, the Court denied certiorari in a
case asking the Court to overrule Auer.347
IV. ASSESSING JUSTICE SCALIA’S IMPACT ON CIVILITY,
JUDICIAL ETHICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY
[E]ven in the most emotion-laden, politically sensitive case,
effective opinion writing does not require a judge to
upbraid colleagues for failing to see the light or to get it
right.348

A. Background
Shortly after Justice Scalia’s death, Judge Voros of the
Utah Court of Appeals began a presentation on civility in the
legal profession by decrying the tone of political discourse that
characterized the 2016 presidential campaign.349 Then he turned
to the courts, admitting that some judges act “in a way we would
have to call uncivil,” and confessing that “it started at the top.”
Recognizing Justice Scalia as “a brilliant jurist,” Judge Voros
also pointed out that the late Justice was often criticized as an
“example of incivility.”350 After quoting Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Obergefell, Judge Voros measured it against the Utah
Standards of Professionalism and Civility,351 which provide that
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 77 Side B
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At least one scholar has applauded Justice Scalia posthumously for changing his mind:
“Once he realized that what he thought . . . was right was wrong, he switched, and then he
was a tireless opponent of Auer.” Nielson, supra note 345, at 306 (footnote omitted).
347. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608
(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Any reader of this Court’s
opinions should think that the [Auer] doctrine is on its last gasp.”).
348. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1197
(1992) (footnote omitted).
349. J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Civility in a Time of Incivility, 30 UTAH B.J. 22, 22 (July–
Aug. 2017).
350. Id. at 23.
351. Utah is a leader in promoting civility in the legal profession. The Utah Supreme
Court adopted Standards of Professionalism and Civility in 2003. See, e.g., UTAH S. CT. R.
14-301, Standards of Professionalism and Civility, https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/
rules/ucja/view.html?title=Rule%2014-301.%20Standards%20of%20Professionalism%20
and%20Civility.&rule=ch14/03%20Civility/USB14-301.html; Michael J. Wilkins, Views
from the Bench: Supreme Court Adopts Professionalism Standard, 16 UTAH BAR J. 31, 31
(Sept. 2003). In 2015, the Utah Supreme Court linked the Civility Standards to the Utah
Code of Professional Conduct by providing that serious or repeated violations of the
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[l]awyers shall not, without an adequate factual basis,
attribute to other counsel or the court improper motives,
purpose, or conduct. Lawyers should avoid hostile,
demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral
communications with adversaries. Neither written
submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the
integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior
of an adversary unless such matters are directly relevant
352
under controlling substantive law.

“Hostile, demeaning, humiliating?” asked Judge Voros, “I think
so.” And “Disparaging the intelligence of another?” he asked.
“Again, I think so.”353 And then he offered some advice to his
listeners: “[E]ven if you look to Justice Scalia as a model in
other ways, please do not imitate his tone of incivility.”354
Judge Voros is right.355 The buck stops at the top.356 Judges
and Justices should be held to standards at least as high as those
applied to other lawyers,357 setting an example of dignified,
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Standards “may support a finding that the lawyer has violated [the Utah rule] prohibiting
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” See Voros, supra note 349, at
22 (citing UTAH R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4, cmt. 3a).
352. Voros, supra note 349, at 23 (quoting UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM
AND CIVILITY R. 3).
353. Id. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia was not alone. Judge Voros continued by
discussing intemperate outbursts by other appellate judges. Id. at 23–24 (citing In re
Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 769 F.3d 762, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see also, e.g., Jessie
Opoien, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice David Prosser to Retire, Replacement Will
Serve Until 2020, CAPITAL TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/
govt-and-politics/election-matters/wisconsin-supreme-court-justice-david-prosser-to-retirereplacement-will/article_fbd6c7ea-a7e7-535f-8954-2d17c94836af.html.
354. Voros, supra note 349, at 23. Judge Voros stopped just short of referring to Justice
Scalia as a bully: “[M]ake no mistake, the conduct condemned by Rule 3—hostile,
demeaning, and humiliating words and personal attacks—is not just uncivil, but bullying
and abusive. And to seek a result in our system of justice by bullying is to repudiate the
rule of law.” Id. at 25.
355. Judge Voros is not the first judge to express concerns about the rhetoric of
Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, The Special Professional
Challenges of Appellate Judging, 35 IND. L. REV. 381, 389 & nn.43, 44 (2002)
(“Venomous language obscures the law and erodes civility in our profession. It is a
problem that affects even the United States Supreme Court.” (citing examples)).
356. See Voros, supra note 349, and accompanying text; see also Randall T. Shepard,
Judicial Professionalism and the Relations between Judges and Lawyers, 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 223, 223 (2000) (“While judges and lawyers are cut from the
same cloth, judges have many obligations that practitioners do not.”).
357. See Everett V. Abbott & Charles A. Boston, The Judiciary and the Administration
of the Law, 45 AM. L. REV. 481, 512 (1911) (“The bench comes from the bar, and the
standards of the bench are ultimately the standards of the bar.”).
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358. E.g., UTAH S. CT. R. 14-301, supra note 351; see Cheryl B. Preston & Hilary
Lawrence, Incentivizing Lawyers to Play Nice: A National Survey of Civility Standards and
Options for Enforcement, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 701, 707–09, 739–44 (2015)
(surveying and critiquing state professionalism creeds adopted since late 1980s).
359. See Joseph P. Williams, The Ethical Honor System, USNEWS.COM (June 9, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2017-06-09/supreme-court-justices-playby-their-own-ethics-rules (discussing Justices’ travel).
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civil, and professional conduct. Judicial incivility and
intemperance, especially when displayed by members of the
Supreme Court, set the wrong example for other judges and the
legal profession.
Dismayed by the lack of civility that Judge Voros
highlighted, many state supreme courts have adopted standards
of professionalism and civility to supplement the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct for lawyers.358 The professionalism
movement has also addressed judicial civility. As this Part
explains, however, the development and evolution of judicial
codes of conduct have followed a different path and timeline.
Indeed, while most civility and professionalism codes have been
initiatives of the bench and bar, judicial conduct codes in
particular were often adopted in response to Congressional
concerns and initiatives. And one small but influential group is
exempt from even the standards of conduct that now apply to all
other federal judges: the nine Justices of the Supreme Court.359
Whether that significant gap warrants reconsideration is
discussed below.
Standards of conduct for lawyers and judges alike all trace
their history to the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. An
analysis of the century-long effort to encourage lawyer civility is
beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this section touches on
the professionalism codes and standards pertaining to judges,
which were initially developed by the ABA and for decades
were cited as ethical guidelines for federal judges. But since the
late 1970s, the federal judiciary’s code of conduct for federal
judges has departed in significant ways from the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.
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B. Judicial Conduct Codes
Judicial codes of conduct have a complex history.360 Two
parallel systems—state supreme courts overseeing state courts
and federal courts subject to Congressional oversight—
complicate the picture. While most federal judges are appointed
for life, some state judges are elected and others are selected
under merit-based procedures. This section focuses on the
federal courts, where Justice Scalia spent his entire judicial
career.
1. The ABA’s Canons of Judicial Ethics
The bar began calling for canons of judicial ethics soon
after the ABA issued the Canons of Professional Ethics for
lawyers.361 The effort gathered force in 1922 when federal judge
Kennesaw Mountain Landis accepted a generous salary to serve
as the first commissioner of baseball while still on the bench.362
The ensuing controversy led the ABA to adopt Canons of
Judicial Ethics in 1924.363
In the meantime, at the urging of then-Chief Justice Taft,
Congress established the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,
charged with overseeing the business of the federal courts.364
After advisory ethics opinions issued by the Conference began
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360. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 272. Beginning with the Judiciary Act of
1789, Lievense and Cohn provide a concise overview of early congressional efforts to
regulate the conduct of federal judges, beyond the Constitution’s provision for appointment
for life conditioned on the judge’s good behavior. Much of this section’s discussion relies
on Lievense and Cohn’s work.
361. Id. at 272–73; see also, e.g., Abbott & Boston, supra note 357, at 506 (calling for
judicial reform, including a code of judicial ethics).
362. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 272–73. Judge Landis’s appointment as
baseball commissioner followed the 1919 World Series scandal. Id. at 273. He resigned
from the bench after the ABA censured him. The resulting controversy cleared away the
last opposition to ethical guidelines for judges. Id.
363. 1924 Canons, supra note 59.
364. Pub. L. No. 67-298, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (1922). That group would later
become known as the Judicial Conference of the United States, which continues to serve as
the rule-making and conduct-regulating arm of the federal court system. 28 U.S.C. § 331
(2012); see also, e.g., Dana A. Remus, The Institutional Politics of Federal Judicial
Conduct Regulation, 31 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 33, 39 & n.26 (2012).
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citing the 1924 Canons,365 they became guiding principles for
the federal judiciary over the next several decades.366 But as
history has shown, that practice changed after 1973, when the
Conference first adopted its own code of conduct for federal
judges.
2. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges
The failed 1968 nomination of Justice Fortas to serve as
Chief Justice triggered further efforts to establish a code of
conduct specifically for federal judges.367 After proposed
legislation was introduced in Congress, Chief Justice Burger
called on the Judicial Conference, which adopted several
resolutions that generated a favorable congressional response.368
These events rekindled ABA efforts to strengthen regulation of
judicial conduct,369 leading to appointment of an ABA
committee to revisit the 1924 Canons.370
In 1972, the ABA issued its substantially revamped Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.371 In the meantime, the Judicial
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365. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 274, 275; Remus, supra note 364, at 41 &
nn.38, 39. Before 1980, neither the Judicial Conference nor its predecessor had any binding
authority over federal judges. Remus, supra note 364, at 40.
366. In particular, Canon 19 cautioned appellate judges against issuing separate
opinions except in cases of special public significance. See supra notes 59–61 and
accompanying text. Canons 10 and 34 envisioned judges who were “courteous to counsel
. . . and also to all others . . . in the court,” who refrained from seeking “public praise,” and
who did not “administer the office for the purpose of . . . popularity.” 1924 Canons, supra
note 59, at Canon 10, Canon 34.
367. Justice Fortas had accepted fees from a foundation associated with a former client
then under investigation for securities violations. Remus, supra note 364, at 44 & n.51.
After a filibuster forced President Johnson to withdraw the nomination, Justice Fortas
continued on the Court for a time, but soon resigned after repeated threats of impeachment.
Id.; see also Elizabeth King, A Filibuster on a Supreme Court Nomination Is So Rare
It’s Only Worked Once, TIME.COM (Feb. 8, 2017), http://time.com/4659403/neilgorsuch-filibuster-abe-fortas/ (describing downfall of Justice Fortas); see also Lievense
& Cohn, supra note 56, at 274–75 (discussing Justice Fortas, related inquiries, and
proposed judicial-reform legislation).
368. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 275; Remus, supra note 364, at 46–47.
369. Remus, supra note 364, at 46–47.
370. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 275.
371. Id. at 276; ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972), http://fsmsupreme
court.org/pdf/1972codeofjudicialconduct.pdf [hereinafter ABA Model Code]; see also E.
Wayne Thode, The Code of Judicial Conduct—The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977
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Conference considered whether the ABA Model Code should
apply to federal judges. A few months later, the Conference
adopted the first version of what is now the Code of Conduct for
U.S. Judges. Closely following the ABA Model Code, it included
a few variations.372 For example, it expressly applied to all
federal judges except Supreme Court Justices.373
For the most part, the Conference’s adoption of the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges persuaded Congress that the federal
judiciary could police its own. Even so, Congress remained
concerned about the lack of standards for judicial
disqualification.374 To address that concern, it amended and
expanded
the
statutory
circumstances
warranting
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Utah L. Rev. 395, 396 (“[T]the Preface to the Code makes clear that its standards are
intended to be enforceable.”).
372. Judicial Conference of the United States, Code of Judicial Conduct for United
States Judges, 69 F.R.D. 273, 273 (1975) [footnoted hereinafter as Code for U.S. Judges]
(“The Code is based upon the [ABA] Code of Judicial Conduct . . . . To the extent possible
the language of the [ABA] Code has been retained.”); see Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, April 5–6, 1973, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., H. Doc. No. 93103, at 9–11 (adopting ABA Model Code with modifications); Remus, supra note 364, at
48. The Code for U.S. Judges acknowledged federal statutes governing judicial conduct,
removed some of the ABA’s commentary about extrajudicial income, and amended the
ABA canon regulating judges’ political activities. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 276;
see also Code of Conduct for United States Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www
.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch02_0.pdf (March 20, 2014) (providing current text
of Code for U.S. Judges).
373. See Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at 273 (omitting Supreme Court Justices
from its reach); Thode, supra note 371, at 395; see also Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox
Guarding the Henhouse? Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57
RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 138 (2004) (reasoning that the Code for U.S. Judges
“[t]echnically . . . does not govern the Justices” (citations omitted)); see also Warren
Weaver, Jr., Tough Code of Ethics Adopted for Judges in Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, at 1
(Apr. 7, 1973) (“A tough and comprehensive new code of ethics covering all Federal
judges except the nine members of the Supreme Court was adopted today by the Judicial
Conference of the United States.” (emphasis added)).
374. Congressional concerns about judicial disqualification may have been prompted in
part by then-Justice Rehnquist’s refusal to recuse in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972),
despite having advocated for the government’s position while an Assistant Attorney
General. Thode, supra note 371, at 403 n.36. Justice Rehnquist’s decision was criticized as
inconsistent with Canon 3C of the ABA Model Code, even though it did not apply to
Justices. By amending the language of Canon 3C into Title 28, Congress settled the issue.
Thode, supra note 371, at 403 n.36.
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disqualification,375 which were expressly extended to Supreme
Court Justices.376
3. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980
In the aftermath of Watergate and President Nixon’s
resignation, Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act of
1978, which applied to all “judicial officers”377 and required the
Judicial Conference to appoint a Judicial Ethics Committee to
enforce the Act.378 The Conference soon proposed legislation
that would become the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.379 Significantly, the 1980
Judicial Conduct Act shifted primary authority over misconduct
complaints and sanctions to the chief judges of the federal courts
of appeals and circuit judicial councils.380 Congress reserved a
limited role for the Conference381 and “a loose oversight role”
for Congress.382 But the Act’s vague definition of “misconduct”
left it to the Conference and the judicial councils to determine
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375. Thode, supra note 371, at 402 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455). Compare Pub. L. No. 93512, 88 Stat. 1609 (1974) with ABA Model Code, supra note 371, at Canon 3C (1972).
376. Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (1974); see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (e); Thode,
supra note 371, at 402. Professor Thode researched the reported cases interpreting and
applying Canon 3C and 28 U.S.C. § 455 and concluded that the primary legal issue was not
whether a federal judge was subject to discipline for failing to recuse, but whether the
judge’s participation in deciding the case was reversible error. Id. at 402; e.g., Shell Oil Co.
v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating Federal Court of Claims
judgment for judge’s failure to recuse and remanding for reassignment to different judge).
377. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 4
§§ 101–11 (2012)). The Act defined “judicial officer” to include the members of the
Supreme Court. Id. at § 308(9), 92 Stat. at 1861 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 4
§ 110(9)). The Judicial Conference may have withdrawn its early opposition to the 1978
Act for strategic reasons. See Remus, supra note 364, at 48–52.
378. Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 303, 92 Stat. 1824, 1858 (1978)
[hereinafter 1978 Ethics Act].
379. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Judicial Conduct Act];
Remus, supra note 364, at 52; see Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 283, 284–85 (1982).
380. Remus, supra note 364, at 52; see also id. at 37–38.
381. See 28 U.S.C. § 357 (2012).
382. Remus, supra note 364, at 52; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2012).
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what it encompassed.383 By enacting these provisions, Congress
effectively ceded its sweeping constitutional authority over the
federal courts to the Judicial Conference,384 authorizing it to
enforce standards of judicial conduct.385
4. The Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform Act of 1990 and
the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal
In the 1980s, Congress impeached three federal judges,
renewing concern about misconduct and the effectiveness of
Judicial Conference oversight.386 In 1989, Congress amended
the 1978 Ethics Act, further restricting federal employees,
including federal judges and Justices, from receiving outside
income, honoraria, and gifts while broadening the Judicial
Conference’s enforcement authority.387
As part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,388
Congress enacted the Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform
Act,389 which established the short-lived National Commission
on Judicial Discipline and Removal.390 The National
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383. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). Not until 2009 did the Judicial Conference adopt its own rules
expressly defining what qualifies as judicial “misconduct.” See infra notes 402–03 and
accompanying text.
384. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sheldon Jay Plager, Foreword: The Law of Federal
Judicial Discipline and the Lessons of Social Science, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993)
(describing Act as granting the federal judiciary “formal authority to deal with cases of
misconduct and disability” while reserving to Congress “the ultimate power of removal for
the few cases warranting that action”).
385. Remus, supra note 364, at 52, 54.
386. Id. at 57 & n.127; see Burbank & Plager, supra note 384, at 4 (citing “concerns
about the difficulty of removing federal judges”); see also Remus, supra note 364, at 57 &
n.128 (citing proposed bills and amendments pending in 1989).
387. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2012)); Remus, supra note 364, at 56; see also
5 U.S.C. app. § 109(8) (defining “judicial employee”), § 109(10) (defining “judicial
officer” to include Supreme Court Justices); 5 U.S.C. § 7353(d)(1)(C) (defining
“supervising ethics office” to include Judicial Conference for judicial branch personnel,
including judges). In early 1990, the Judicial Conference amended the Code for U.S.
Judges to incorporate this expanded regulatory authority. Remus, supra note 364, at 56 &
n.121 (citing REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 14, 15 (Mar. 13, 1990)).
388. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
389. Id. §§ 401–18 (codified at various sections of Title 28, U.S.C., including 28 U.S.C.
§ 372 note).
390. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Title IV, Subtitle II, §§ 408–18, codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 372 note (National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Act).
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Commission’s final report391 was generally favorable to the
Judicial Conference, finding that its implementation of the 1980
Judicial Conduct Act was mostly effective. Among other
recommendations, the Commission urged Congress to retain
impeachment as the exclusive method for removing federal
judges from office.392
5. The Judicial Improvements Act of 2002
For a time, Congress seemed at ease with allowing the
federal judiciary to self-regulate judicial conduct393 as long as
the Conference was responsive to public and political
concerns.394 But the Conference had gradually amended the
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges until it deviated significantly
from the ABA Model Code, and the Conference appeared
increasingly resistant to outside suggestions for regulating
judicial conduct.395 Other legislation that would have involved
Congress in regulating the conduct of federal judges failed.396 In
2002, Congress added a new chapter to Title 28 governing the
filing and processing of complaints against federal judges,397
superseding a minor subsection of the 1980 Judicial Conduct
Act. By defining “judge” narrowly, the 2002 legislation
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391. Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 152
F.R.D. 265 (1993).
392. Id. at 280–81; Remus, supra note 364, at 58 & n.132; see Cynthia Gray, National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Calls for Moderate Changes, 77
JUDICATURE 271, 271 (Mar.-Apr. 1994) (summarizing recommendations); see generally
Burbank & Plager, supra note 384 (summarizing National Commission’s work).
393. “In a word, the [1980] Act relies upon internal judicial branch investigation of
other judges . . . .” JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMMITTEE,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1 (Sept. 2006), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/breyer
committeereport.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Study Committee Report].
394. Remus, supra note 364, at 54; see id. at 61 (noting Congress’s “willing[ness] to
acquiesce in judicial self-regulation” after 1980 Act).
395. Id. at 58 (referring to the federal judiciary’s “increasingly insular and assertive
approach”); id. at 60 (noting that the “Conference appeared unresponsive to calls for the
introduction of relatively moderate accountability measures . . . aimed at increasing judicial
legitimacy and improving the quality of judicial conduct regulation”).
396. See id. at 60.
397. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
107–273, §§ 11041–44, 116 Stat. 1758, 1848–56 (2002) (Judicial Improvements Act of
2002, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2012)).
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expressly put Supreme Court Justices beyond the Judicial
Conference’s regulatory authority.398
6. The 2009 Revisions to the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges
While the ABA Model Code had become increasingly
regulatory with subsequent revisions, the Code of Conduct for
U.S. Judges continued in the form of “guiding principles by
which judges should abide” rather than black-letter rules of
conduct.399 In the first decade of the new century, however, the
Judicial Conference proposed revisions400 that consolidated the
Canons into just four, but otherwise made no “startling
substantive changes.”401
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398. The 2002 Act added the following new provision: “[T]he term ‘judge’ means a
circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1).
Its predecessor subsection in the 1980 Judicial Conduct Act did not specifically define
“judge,” but rather authorized anyone to file a complaint with the appropriate federal court
of appeals alleging misconduct or disability against a federal circuit, district, bankruptcy, or
magistrate judge. See Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 3, 94 Stat. 2035, 2036 (1980) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 372(c) (repealed by Pub. L. 107–273, §ௗ11043(a)(1)(B), 116 Stat. 1758, 1855
(2002)). The 1980 Judicial Conduct Act did not preclude anyone from filing complaints
against Justices alleging misconduct or disability. See Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary
and Improper: The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980, 94 Yale L.J. 1117, 1122 n.31 (1985) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) omitted any
reference to Supreme Court Justices, and quoting House Committee Report for the
rationale). The statutes, then and now, are simply silent on how any complaint against a
Justice is to be handled. Congress undoubtedly retains plenary power to address that gap
short of initiating impeachment proceedings against a Justice. See text accompanying notes
468–74 (describing various Congressional proposals that would do so).
399. Remus, supra note 364, at 65 & n.176; see Gordon J. Quist, Interview: Giving
Advice on Ethics Seldom Simple, 40 THIRD BRANCH 1, 10 (June 2008). Judge Quist, who
then chaired the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct, explained that
“the Committee has always reviewed its Code after the [ABA] adopts and recommends its
Model Code.” Id. But he disclaimed concern that the Code for U.S. Judges simply follows
ABA Model Code amendments. Id. He explained that the Code for U.S. Judges takes a
more aspirational approach:
The ABA has developed a more detailed regulatory approach in its Model Code.
Regulations tend to be black and white. Our Canons are guiding principles by
which [federal] judges should abide. . . . [We] try to get the whole Judiciary to
adhere to and aspire to achieve these principles, recognizing that there are vast
areas of judgment.
Id.
400. Remus, supra note 364, at 65.
401. Quist, supra note 399, at 10.

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 82 Side B

06/11/2018 08:46:58

ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

272

6/4/2018 3:17 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

After the revisions were adopted in March 2009,402 the
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges for the first time included rules
specifically defining judicial “misconduct.” The rules were most
recently amended in 2015. As of this writing, “cognizable
misconduct”

06/11/2018 08:46:58

402. See Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372.
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(1) is conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts. Misconduct
includes, but is not limited to:
(A) using the judge’s office to obtain special
treatment for friends or relatives;
(B) accepting bribes, gifts, or other personal favors
related to the judicial office;
(C) having improper discussions with parties or
counsel for one side in a case;
(D) treating litigants, attorneys, or others in a
demonstrably egregious and hostile manner;
(E) engaging in partisan political activity or making
inappropriately partisan statements;
(F) soliciting funds for organizations;
(G) retaliating against complainants, witnesses, or
others for their participation in this complaint process;
(H) refusing, without good cause shown, to cooperate
in the investigation of a complaint under these Rules;
or
(I) violating other specific, mandatory standards of
judicial conduct, such as those pertaining to
restrictions on outside income and requirements for
financial disclosure.
(2) is conduct occurring outside the performance of official
duties if the conduct might have a prejudicial effect on the
administration of the business of the courts, including a
substantial and widespread lowering of public confidence
in the courts among reasonable people.
(3) does not include:
(A) an allegation that is directly related to the merits
of a decision or procedural ruling. An allegation that
calls into question the correctness of a judge’s ruling,
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including a failure to recuse, without more, is meritsrelated. If the decision or ruling is alleged to be the
result of an improper motive, e.g., a bribe, ex parte
contact, racial or ethnic bias, or improper conduct in
rendering a decision or ruling, such as personally
derogatory remarks irrelevant to the issues, the
complaint is not cognizable to the extent that it attacks
the merits.
(B) an allegation about delay in rendering a decision
or ruling, unless the allegation concerns an improper
motive in delaying a particular decision or habitual
403
delay in a significant number of unrelated cases.

Justice Scalia’s many dissenting opinions excoriating his
colleagues and others appear to meet the Conference’s own
definition of misconduct. His vituperative tone was neither
necessary to state his points nor relevant to the issues they
addressed. In particular, his frequent outbursts delivering
“personally derogatory remarks irrelevant to the issues” did not
qualify as “merits-related” action, otherwise excluded from the
definition under subsection (3)(A). Instead, his disrespectful
rhetoric appears to have violated subsection 1(D) by treating
“others in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner.”
7. The Judicial Conference’s Ongoing Role in Promoting
Judicial Civility and Exemplary Conduct

06/11/2018 08:46:58

403. Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, United States
Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/guide-vol02e-ch03.pdf (May 4, 2016)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Conduct and Disability Rules]; see also Code for U.S.
Judges, supra note 372.
404. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (requiring Conference to “carry on a continuous study of the
operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure” and to recommend
“changes in and additions to those rules as the Conference may deem desirable to promote
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and
the elimination of unjustifiable expense”); see generally Governance & the Judicial
Conference, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/
governance-judicial-conference.
405. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 111(3) (2012) (designating Judicial Conference to administer
the 1978 Ethics Act with respect to judicial officers and employees).
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Conference regulates the ethical conduct of federal judges405 and
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handles complaints406 that allege “conduct prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts,” or inability “to discharge all the duties of office by
reason of mental or physical disability.”407 But most of the
relevant statutes narrowly define “judge” to mean every sort of
federal judge except Supreme Court Justices.408 For that reason,
Justice Scalia was not subject to Judicial Conference standards
and discipline once he joined the Court in 1986.
8. Congressional Oversight of Article III Courts
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406. 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364 (2012).
407. Id. at § 351(a); see generally 2006 Study Committee Report, supra note 393
(reporting findings of Committee appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and chaired by
Justice Breyer in response to congressional concerns about deficiencies in complaint
processing by chief judges of federal courts of appeals).
408. See note 398, supra. Only the judicial disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455,
expressly applies to Supreme Court Justices. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
409. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. But Congress can specify the scope of the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Id. at § 2. (enabling Congress to regulate and make
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
410. See supra notes 380–85 and accompanying text.
411. See, e.g., infra notes 427–31 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg);
Thomas, supra note 3, at 515–16.
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The Constitution famously provides that federal judges
hold office during “good behaviour.”409 Controversies between
Congress and the federal courts over regulating judicial conduct
ultimately revolve around which branch of government has the
constitutional power to decide what constitutes good judicial
behavior. Congress, with the acquiescence and support of the
federal judiciary, has exercised some of this regulatory authority
but has delegated most of it to the federal courts themselves.410
But neither the Supreme Court nor the Judicial Conference
has set a high standard for judicial civility. Through nearly three
decades, under two Chief Justices, Justice Scalia wrote hundreds
of dissents that were at best discourteous and at worst
egregiously disrespectful. Even though some members of the
Supreme Court have championed civility and professionalism in
the law,411 Justice Scalia’s judicial colleagues most often
acquiesced in his behavior, remaining silent instead of
expressing disapproval. Worse, some linked their work to his by
joining his aggressively worded dissents, or by using
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intemperate or disrespectful rhetoric of their own. They are in
part responsible for the legacy of disrespect that Justice Scalia
left in the Court’s reported opinions.
V. JUDICIAL INCIVILITY, INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY,
AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Judges need and welcome guidance on their ethical
responsibilities, and sources such as the Judicial
Conference’s Code of Conduct provide invaluable
assistance. But at the end of the day, no compilation of
ethical rules can guarantee integrity.412

A. Background: The Scalia Effect

06/11/2018 08:46:58

412. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 11, S. CT. OF
U.S. (Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011yearendreport.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Report].
413. Yalof et al., supra note 102, at 12–13.
414. E.g., Katy Steinmetz, This Is What “Jiggery-Pokery” Means, TIME (June 25,
2015), http://time.com/3936188/scalia-jiggery-pokery/ (noting Justice Scalia’s use of
“interpretive jiggery-pokery” in Obergefell dissent); see Schapiro, supra note 322
(noting use of “I would hide my head in a bag”).
THE

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 84 Side A

Justice Scalia’s aggressively blunt style of opinion writing
and the media attention it drew meant that his reputation for
incivility extended beyond legal circles. A team of political
scientists studying the differences in rhetoric between the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts concluded that Justice Scalia
fueled “divisiveness” on the Court, describing his style as
“belligerent” and noting that he “relentlessly attack[ed] those
who might disagree with his ideology or judging philosophy.”413
Justice Scalia’s aggressive—albeit sometimes witty—rhetoric
was read outside academia as well, passages from his dissents
routinely appearing in the popular media.414 Although members
of the general public rarely read multi-page court opinions,
Justice Scalia had a knack for using catchphrases that would
attract public attention, even if the opinions in which they
appeared had failed to attract a majority of votes on the Court. If

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 84 Side B

06/11/2018 08:46:58

ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

276

6/4/2018 3:17 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

his motive for using disrespectful rhetoric was public
attention,415 the record shows that he succeeded.
But a Supreme Court dissent should do more than generate
attention. It should educate and enlighten judges, lawyers, law
students, and law professors, and help clarify points of
disagreement among the Justices.416 If carefully and concisely
expressed, its reasoning can influence the way the Justices and
other readers think about legal issues even though it failed to
garner the support of the majority. The dissent’s role in
clarifying points of disagreement and shaping legal thinking
does not, however, justify separate opinions written in a
pointedly vituperative tone. Disrespectful rhetoric, hyperbole,
venom, and personal attacks in Supreme Court dissents reflect
poorly on the entire judiciary.417 And if the justification for
publishing dissents is in part their capacity to persuade future
readers,418 a bombastic and disrespectful tone hardly advances
that purpose.
Yet Justice Scalia refused to acknowledge both the internal
and external effects of his biting dissents. Beginning in 1994,
when he posited that the dissenting tradition reflected favorably
on the Court, he reassured readers that dissents “do not, or at
least need not, produce animosity and bitterness among the
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415. See, e.g., Kapgan, supra note 6, at 98–99; but see 1924 Canons, supra note 59, at
Canon 34 (providing that a judge should not seek public praise or popularity).
416. See, e.g., Greg Goelzhauser, Silent Acquiescence on the Supreme Court, 36
JUSTICE SYS. J. 3, 5 (2015) (describing value of dissents); id. at 7 (observing that dissents
have higher value in “important” cases); Scalia, supra note 5, at 39 (explaining that issuing
separate opinions “to set forth clear and consistent positions on both sides of the major
legal issues of the day . . . has kept the Court in the forefront of the intellectual
development of the law”); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 806 (“Certainly a dissenting opinion
can serve as a rhetorical resource for those who object to a decision.”).
417. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 2, at 53 (pointing out that as Supreme Court’s
“political nature becomes more easily discerned—both because of the issues it is deciding
and the language used in the Court’s decisions—reverence to the institution, its Justices,
and more importantly, its decisions, appears to be increasingly scarce”).
418. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 5, at 36–37. Justice Scalia explained that dissents “can
help to change the law,” but as he readily conceded, “[t]hat effect is most common in the
decisions of intermediate appellate tribunals.” Id. at 36. On the other hand, Justice
Ginsburg has estimated that up to four times each term, an opinion initially circulated
internally as a dissent gains sufficient votes to become the opinion of the Court. Ginsburg,
supra note 5, at 4. But dissents’ internal value as part of the Court’s decisionmaking
process does not justify publishing verbose diatribes that reflect a lack of respect for judges
and the American judicial system as a whole.
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members of the Court.”419 Whatever Justice Scalia might have
thought about dissents’ effects on intra-Court relationships, it is
much worse for a Supreme Court Justice to engage in
disrespectful rhetoric than for any other appellate judge to do so.
A heated dissent cannot diminish the precedential value of the
Court’s opinion. But if it takes a combative tone toward other
Justices (or even toward appellate counsel), the dissenting
opinion reflects unfavorably on the judicial author and threatens
public respect for the Court as an institution.
Some of Justice Scalia’s biting rhetoric and sharp
witticisms might be entertaining to read, but they reflect poorly
on the Court that failed to do anything about them. In particular,
Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts, who led the Court during
Justice Scalia’s tenure, bear some responsibility for allowing his
dissents routinely to cross “the rhetorical Rubicon between
professional critique and personal attack.”420 Chief Justice
Rehnquist even joined many Scalia dissents, turning a blind eye
to any damage they might do. And while Chief Justice Roberts
rarely joined a Scalia dissent,421 some of his own separate
opinions tread dangerously close to the line between expression
of strong disagreement and disrespectful hyperbole.422
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419. Scalia, supra note 5, at 40. Notably, Justice Scalia’s 1994 article addressing
dissents did not mention the then-new civility standards adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
1992. See Standards for Professional Conduct Within the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit:
Judges’ Duties to Each Other [hereinafter Seventh Circuit Standards], http://www.ca7.us
courts.gov/rules-procedures/rules//rules.htm#standards. The Seventh Circuit Standards
include recommendations on improving civility among judges, particularly in judicial
opinions. As Justice Ginsburg once noted before joining the Court, there is room for
improvement. Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 1194–95 (citing several Scalia dissents that
excoriated the Court’s reasoning).
420. Porto, supra note 10, at 28.
421. In their decade together on the Court, the current Chief Justice joined twenty-one
dissents written by Justice Scalia, two of them only in part.
422. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting):
Five lawyers [in the majority] have closed the debate and enacted their own
vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law. Stealing this issue from the
people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic
social change that much more difficult to accept.
The majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment. The right it
announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent. The
majority expressly disclaims judicial “caution” and omits even a pretense of
humility, openly relying on its desire to remake society according to its own
“new insight” into the “nature of injustice.” . . . As a result, the Court
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Justice Scalia will be missed, but not because he was a role
model for exemplary judicial conduct.423 Historians will assess
the impact of his tenure on the Court. We cannot yet know what
his true legacy will be—how his judicial writing will be received
by future law students, lawyers, judges, and scholars. But Justice
Scalia likely will be remembered less for the influence of the
reasoning behind his dissents than for his intemperance in
expressing his views.424
Justice Scalia was apparently aware of the Court’s fragile
hold on its own institutional legitimacy. Among the most
offensive comments in his dissents was a repeated critique of his
colleagues’ opinions for seeming to reflect or even underscore
the Court’s own “impotence.”425 He frequently reminded his
fellow Justices of the Court’s tenuous hold on its own posterity.
History has already proved him right on that score. The
conservative “lion on the Court”426 most certainly did not
elevate public or scholarly opinion of the Court. Instead, his
scathing dissents cast it into disrepute.
Before joining the Court, Justice Ginsburg, who would
become Justice Scalia’s closest friend on the Court, expressed
her distaste for disrespectful dissent. In 1992, soon after the
beginning of the civility movement, then-Judge Ginsburg
observed that if judges expect their decisions to be respected,
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Id.
423. See, e.g., Voros, supra note 349, at 23; Yalof et al., supra note 102, at 12–13.
424. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 323; Schapiro, supra note 322.
425. E.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s
approach in Obergefell is a classic of this type:
Hubris is sometimes defined as o’erweening pride; and pride, we know, goeth
before a fall. The Judiciary is the “least dangerous” of the federal branches
because it has “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm” and the States, “even for the efficacy
of its judgments.” With each decision of ours that takes from the People a
question properly left to them—with each decision that is unabashedly based not
on law, but on the “reasoned judgment” of a bare majority of this Court—we
move one step closer to being reminded of our impotence.
Id. (citation omitted).
426. E.g., David Helling, Reaction to Antonin Scalia’s Death: “A Lion on the Court
and an Unwavering Defender of the Constitution”, KAN. CITY STAR (Feb. 13, 2016), http:
//www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article60286391.html (quoting Senator
Blunt).
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invalidates the marriage laws of more than half the States and orders the
transformation of a social institution that has formed the basis of human society
for millennia . . . . Just who do we think we are?
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they should write with a degree of reserve appropriate to the
judicial office:
[T]he effective judge . . . strives to persuade, and not to
pontificate. She speaks in “a moderate and restrained”
voice, engaging in a dialogue with, not a diatribe against,
co-equal departments of government, state authorities, and
427
even her own colleagues.

Then she cited examples of opinions she classified as
“condemnations” of other judges “that generate more heat than
light,”428 including several separate opinions authored by Justice
Scalia.429 She found these examples regrettable, asserting that
“even in the most emotion-laden, politically sensitive case,
effective opinion writing does not require a judge to upbraid
colleagues for failing to see the light or to get it right.”430 The
soon-to-be next nominee to the Supreme Court was absolutely
correct.431
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427. Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 1186 (quoting Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963)).
428. Id. at 1194.
429. Id. at 1194–95 & nn.49–51, 54, 57 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I must . . . respond
to a few of the more outrageous arguments in today’s opinion, which it is beyond human
nature to leave unanswered.” . . . “To portray Roe as the statesmanlike ‘settlement’ of a
divisive issue, a jurisprudential Peace of Westphalia that is worth preserving, is nothing
less than Orwellian.”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633, 636, 638, 644 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (describing Court’s opinion as “oblivious to our history,” “incoherent,”
“nothing short of ludicrous,” and “a jurisprudential disaster”); Morgan v. Ill., 504 U.S. 719,
751–52 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today, . . . the Court strikes a further blow against
the People in its campaign against the death penalty.”); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“Justice O’Connor’s
assertion . . . that a fundamental rule of judicial restraint’ requires us to avoid reconsidering
Roe, cannot be taken seriously.”)).
430. Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 1197.
431. Just as her article went to press, Judge Ginsburg was nominated by President
Clinton to serve on the Supreme Court with Justice Scalia himself. Id. at 1185 n.* Whether
Judge Ginsburg would have penned the same article after her confirmation as Justice is
highly doubtful. In 2010, she wrote again about dissents, raising and then sidestepping the
question whether dissents have a negative effect on the Court’s internal working
relationships:
Are there lasting rifts sparked by sharply worded dissents? Justice Scalia spoke
to that question nicely. He said: “I doubt whether any two [J]ustices have
dissented from one another’s opinions any more regularly, or any more sharply,
than did my former colleague Justice William Brennan and I. I always
considered him, however, one of my best friends on the Court, and I think that
feeling was reciprocated.” The same might be said today about my friendship
with Justice Scalia.
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B. The Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges
1. Relevant Provisions
The 1924 Canons directly addressed the ethics of opinion
writing:
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of
last resort should use effort and self-restraint to promote
solidarity of conclusion and the consequent influence of
judicial decision. A judge should not yield to pride of
opinion or value more highly his individual reputation than
that of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in case
of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental
principle, dissents should be discouraged in courts of last
432
resort.
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Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 4 (quoting Scalia, supra note 5, at 41 (citation omitted)).
432. 1924 Canons, supra note 59, at Canon 19 para. 4; see also supra note 366 and
accompanying text.
433. The ABA Model Code provisions on civility have also evolved over the years. But
because Justice Scalia spent his entire judicial career on the federal bench, a full discussion
of that process is beyond the scope of this article. For general information about those
developments, see Thode, supra note 371.
434. The canons are presented as black-letter aspirational standards. See, e.g., Code for
U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at Canons 1 & 2 (“A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and
Independence of the Judiciary,” and “A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the
Appearance of Impropriety in All Activities” (emphasis added)).
435. Id. at Canon 3(A)(3).
436. Id. at Canon 3(A)(3) cmt.
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But nothing like that provision has so far appeared in any
version of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges.433
The current Code is primarily aspirational rather than
mandatory.434 Yet Canon 3 addresses judicial civility, providing
that a judge, when acting in an official capacity, should “be
patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants, jurors,
witnesses, lawyers, and others” and should “require similar
conduct of those subject to the judge’s control.”435 The related
commentary elaborates, providing that the duty to be respectful
imposed by Canon 3 “includes the responsibility to avoid
comment or behavior that could reasonably be interpreted as
harassment, prejudice or bias.”436 And it also explains that a
judge who has “reliable evidence” that another judge has failed
to comply with the canons should take “appropriate action,”
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such as “direct communication with the judge . . . [or] reporting
the conduct to the appropriate authorities.”437
Just as the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges omits any
standard on writing separate opinions, it also fails to provide
explicit guidelines for the conduct of judges in their interactions
with one another. Ironically, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit set the right example twenty-five years
ago when it adopted its Standards for Professional Conduct.438
With regard to judicial opinions, the Seventh Circuit Standards
require judges to be “courteous, respectful, and civil in opinions,
ever mindful that a position articulated by another judge is the
result of that judge’s earnest effort to interpret the law and the
facts correctly.” They also provide that a judge must in “all
written and oral communications . . . abstain from disparaging
personal remarks or criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning
comments about another judge.”439
2. Reach of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges
In 2011, Chief Justice Roberts took it upon himself to
announce in his annual report to Congress440 that “[t]he Code of

Judges’ Duties to Each Other
1. We will be courteous, respectful, and civil in opinions, ever mindful that a
position articulated by another judge is the result of that judge’s earnest effort to
interpret the law and the facts correctly.
2. In all written and oral communications, we will abstain from disparaging
personal remarks or criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning comments about
another judge.
3. In all written and oral communications, we will abstain from disparaging
personal remarks or criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning comments about
another judge.

06/11/2018 08:46:58

Id.
439. Id. The author’s exhaustive research failed to unearth any evidence that the
Supreme Court has ever taken a position on the Seventh Circuit Standards generally or
their judicial civility provisions in particular.
440. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (“The Chief Justice shall submit to Congress an annual report
of the proceedings of the Judicial Conference and its recommendations for legislation.”).
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437. Id. at Canon 3(B)(5) cmt. Just who the “appropriate authorities” are with respect to
the conduct of Supreme Court Justices is the central question of this Part.
438. Seventh Circuit Standards, supra note 419:
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Conduct, by its express terms, applies only to lower federal
court judges.”441 He went on to explain the rationale:
That reflects a fundamental difference between the
Supreme Court and the other federal courts. Article III . . .
creates only . . . the Supreme Court . . . , but it empowers
Congress to establish additional lower federal courts . . . .
Because the Judicial Conference is an instrument for the
management of the lower federal courts, its committees
have no mandate to prescribe rules or standards for any
442
other body.

But the Compliance section of the Code, which dictates who
must comply with its provisions, defines “judge” broadly to
mean “[a]nyone who is an officer of the federal judicial system
authorized to perform judicial functions.”443 Supreme Court
Justices surely qualify under that definition.
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441. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 3. As the Chief Justice recognized, the Code for
U.S. Judges, by its express terms, does not apply to Supreme Court Justices. But as he
conceded, statutes requiring financial disclosures do. Id. at 6. Moreover, Congress in 1974
amended what was then Canon 3C of the Code for U.S. Judges into the disqualification
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and expressly applied those provisions to Supreme Court Justices,
see id. at § 455(a); see also Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 1, 88 Stat. 1609 (1974). Thus, while
Canon 3C itself does not expressly apply to the Justices, § 455 and its mandatory
disqualification provisions unquestionably do.
The Chief Justice also reported in 2011 that the Court had adopted “an internal
resolution” agreeing to comply with Conference rules on gifts and extrajudicial
compensation. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 6–7. But he did not mention that the 1978
Ethics Act, with its restrictions and reporting requirements for extrajudicial compensation
and gifts, expressly applies to Supreme Court Justices. See 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101(f)(11),
109(10) (2012). Adopting an internal resolution to voluntarily comply with Conference
rules that mirror existing federal statutes suggests that some Justices might question the
constitutionality of statutory ethics requirements that expressly apply to the Supreme
Court. But no direct evidence suggests that the Court has ever challenged the applicability
of ethics statutes to the Justices, including the 1978 Ethics Act as well as the
disqualification statute, which Congress amended in 1940 to expressly apply to all federal
judges, including the Justices. 28 U.S.C. § 455 note.
442. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 3–4. No doubt the Chief Justice was relying on the
scope provision of the Code, which does not mention Supreme Court Justices. See Code for
U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at 1–2. But his point begs the question. The Conference is “an
instrument for the management of the lower federal courts” only because Congress in
2002, perhaps at the Supreme Court’s behest, expressly restricted its reach to judges of the
lower federal courts. Before then, no such restrictive definition appeared in the relevant
statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (repealed 2002); see also supra notes 397–98 and
accompanying text.
443. Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at Canon 5 cmt.
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3. Federal Judicial Center Guidelines on Opinion Writing
The Federal Judicial Center manual on judicial writing444
generally supports the right of judges and justices to write
separate opinions. The Writing Manual nonetheless cautions
judges against doing so for the wrong reasons, acknowledging
that “[d]issenting opinions are written at a potential cost.”445
A dissent that sounds strident or preachy may contribute to
divisiveness and ill feelings in the court, may undermine
the authority of the majority opinion and of the court as an
institution, and may create confusion. Whether judges
should dissent depends on the nature of the case and the
principle at issue. Judges generally should not write
dissenting opinions when the principle at issue is settled
and the decision has little significance outside the specific
case. Cases that involve emerging legal principles or
statutory interpretation in areas that will affect future
activities of the bar, the public, and the government are
more likely to warrant dissenting opinions than cases of
limited application. The issue should be significant enough
that the judge’s “fever is aroused” as one judge said, but the
motivation for writing a dissent should be to further the
development of the law rather than to vent personal
feelings. Judges considering whether to dissent should ask
themselves whether the likely benefits outweigh the
446
potential costs.
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 88 Side A
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444. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR
JUDGES (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter Writing Manual]. The Federal Judicial Center is a
creature of Congress, directed by statute “to further the development and adoption of
improved judicial administration in the courts of the United States” by providing research,
training, and staff support to the Judicial Conference and its committees. Pub. L. 90-219,
81 Stat. 664 (1967) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (2012)). The Chief
Justice chairs the Center’s governing board. 28 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1); see About the FJC,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/about.
445. Writing Manual, supra note 444, at 29.
446. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, Judge Wald has wisely cautioned judges against
using intemperate rhetoric in their opinions, citing the animosity that can result:
The temptation can be overpowering for a writing judge to give vent to
longstanding frustrations with a colleague by pejorative references to his point of
view as “hopelessly muddled”; “reminiscent of Marie Antoinette’s advice to let
them eat cake”; “beyond all reason”; “pure speculation and fantasy”; “a
Linnaean leap”; “shoddy”; an “ad hoc judgment”; “devoid of precedent”;
“ungoverned by law.” Chronic antagonists relentlessly dig out old cases or even
old law review articles to show inconsistencies in each other’s positions.
Tensions build on a court as judges of all stripes work together over decades.
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And when a judge decides to write a dissent, the Writing Manual
urges caution in choosing the content and tone of the opinion:
A dissenting opinion should not simply slash at the
majority opinion or its author. Personal attacks, offensive
language, or a condescending tone should not be used,
although some judges believe that expressing moral outrage
and restrained indignation may sometimes be
447
appropriate.

C. Effects of Incivility in Dissent on Judicial System Integrity
In 1953, long before the beginning of today’s civility
movement, Professor Pound expressed concern about the impact
of “heated” dissents on the integrity of the judicial system.
Maintenance of our characteristic American constitutionallegal polity demands that the courts hold, as they have in
the past, the respect and confidence of the public. What
amounts to attacks on our courts from within, however
well-intentioned and motivated only by sincere convictions
as to the precise content and application of particular legal
precepts[,] are highly unfortunate at this time if they ever
448
had a place in the common-law judicial process.

Far too many dissents authored by Justice Scalia amounted to
stinging attacks from within. He routinely attacked his
colleagues (often singling them out by name) for expressing
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 88 Side B
06/11/2018 08:46:58

The result is often, unconsciously or even consciously, to let their heartfelt likes
or dislikes for other judges seep into their rhetoric.
Wald, supra note 90, at 1381.
447. Writing Manual, supra note 444, at 29 (emphasis added). Judges should, for
similar reasons, exercise restraint in writing concurring opinions:
Most of the considerations applicable to dissenting opinions also apply to
concurrences. . . . A judge should not write a concurring opinion simply to add a
point of view or personal statement that does not further either the decisional or
educational value of the majority opinion. In deciding whether to write a
concurring opinion, the judge should ask the question: Am I writing this for
myself or for the good of the court?
Id. at 30; see also Scalia, supra note 5, at 33 (disapproving “separate concurrences that are
written only to say the same thing better than the court has done, or, worse still, to display
the intensity of the concurring judge’s feeling on the issue before the court” and asserting
that he regarded “such separate opinions as an abuse, and their existence as one of the
arguments against allowing any separate opinions at all”).
448. Pound, supra note 31, at 797 (emphasis added) (criticizing injudicious dissents
repeatedly issued by California Supreme Court Justice Jesse Carter).
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points of view that differed from his own and often criticized the
Court’s prior opinions, including those authored by his fellows
just a few years earlier.
Disrespectful Scalia-style judicial opinions not only reflect
poorly on the integrity of the Court and the judicial system; they
send the wrong message about acceptable professional
demeanor.449 Justice Scalia sometimes said that he wrote his
dissents for law students450—the group most vulnerable to the
influence of his negative tone. Yet from the beginning of his
judicial career, he must have understood his duty to set a good
example. Calls for judges to model appropriate behavior are not
new:
Judges must, by example and by comments in written
opinions, set the proper tone of civility in the courtroom.
One has only to peruse the pages of current volumes of
reported cases to come upon vitriolic and demeaning
condemnations by the score of a court, judicial colleagues’
opinions, or attorneys. Like it or not, judges are role models
in our profession. Judges cannot ask lawyers to accept a
standard of professional conduct to which they do not
451
abide.

06/11/2018 08:46:58

449. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 323 (referring to the sarcasm and derogatory tone
characteristic of Justice Scalia’s written opinions: “I think that this sends exactly the wrong
message to law students and attorneys about what type of discourse is appropriate in a
formal legal setting and what is acceptable in speaking to one another”).
450. See Scalia, supra note 5, at 39; Senior, supra note 97.
451. Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L.
REV. 513, 519–20 (1994) (reporting on the then-recently adopted Seventh Circuit
Standards); see also, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 1194.
452. Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at Canon 3(A)(3) cmt.; see also ABA Model
Code, supra note 371, at Canon 1, R. 1.2 (requiring judges to “avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety.”); id. at Canon 1, R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (describing test for appearance
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Now that Justice Scalia is no longer a member of the Supreme
Court, the Justices must take the initiative to ensure that every
one of its published opinions, whether written for the Court or as
a separate opinion, sets an example of civility for all other courts
and judges.
The 1924 Canons, the ABA Model Code, the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges, and the Seventh Circuit Standards
differ in some respects, but they share an essential norm
expecting judges to promote “public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary,”452 and to be “patient,
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dignified, respectful, and courteous,”453 especially when acting
in an adjudicative capacity. This norm does not call for artificial
judicial consensus; indeed, appellate judges are expected to
approach cases differently and sometimes to disagree on
outcomes. But every set of canons, rules, and standards for
judicial conduct has incorporated an expectation of judicial
civility, respect, dignity, and courtesy. And measured against
any of these guideposts, many of Justice Scalia’s dissents were
outside the norm.
The Justices should accept their duty to model civility and
courtesy instead of resisting calls to comply with standards of
conduct that apply to all other federal judges.454 Because the
public hears from the Court only through its opinions, every
Justice’s published opinions must exemplify civility and
dignity.455
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of impropriety as “whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that
the judge . . . engaged in . . . conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s . . . impartiality,
temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.”); id. at Canon 2, R. 2.3(A), (B) (requiring
judge to “perform the duties of judicial office . . . without bias or prejudice” and barring
judge “by words or conduct” from showing “bias or prejudice”); id. at Canon 2, R. 2.3 cmt.
2 (defining bias or prejudice to include “epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative
stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile
acts . . . and irrelevant references to personal characteristics”).
453. Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at Canon 3(A)(3). The ABA Model Code
includes similar provisions emphasizing patience, dignity, and courtesy. ABA Model Code,
supra note 371, at R. 2.8(B). The Seventh Circuit Standards are even more expansive.
Seventh Circuit Standards, supra note 419, at R. 1, 2 (requiring judges to be “courteous,
respectful, and civil in opinions” and to “abstain from disparaging personal remarks or
criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning comments”). And the 1924 Canons also included a
courtesy provision. 1924 Canons, supra note 59, at Canon 10 (providing that judges
“should be courteous” to “everyone involved in the administration of justice”).
454. See, e.g., 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 3–4. This resistance may reflect the
Justices’ knowledge that the Code expects judges to act when one of their number fails to
meet its standards. See text accompanying note 437, supra; cf. Heffernan v. City of
Paterson, ___U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (“[I]n the law, what is sauce for the
goose is normally sauce for the gander.”).
455. A Justice’s freedom to dissent does not—or should not—include authority to
express disrespect for judicial colleagues, appellate counsel, parties, or the Court as an
institution. See William G. Ross, Civility Among Judges: Charting the Bounds of Proper
Criticism by Judges of Other Judges, 51 FLA. L. REV. 957, 962 (1999) (“[S]ome judges
have been known to cast aspersions upon the competence, diligence, integrity, or
temperament of other judges. Judges should categorically abstain from such comments
because they detract from the dignity of the judicial system and tend to impugn its
integrity.”); see also Brennan, supra note 1, at 435 (“Dissent for its own sake has no value,
and can threaten the collegiality of the bench.”).
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D. Possible Solutions
It is too late to prevent the publication of intemperate Scalia
dissents. But anticipating improved judicial civility in the future,
this section highlights several proposals and legislative
initiatives to address judicial misconduct, including suggestions
that existing standards of conduct should apply to Supreme
Court Justices.456
1. Internal Action by the Court
Dean Chemerinsky has pointed out that in several respects,
the Court is guilty of a “monumental failure to communicate
with the American public.”457 He has criticized the extreme
sarcasm in Justice Scalia’s dissents458 and has advocated for
improvements in Supreme Court communications, including
“presumptive word and page limits” for published opinions.459
Additionally, Dean Chemerinsky has recommended that the
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges apply to the Justices.460 The
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456. Congress has already applied financial disclosure requirements and
disqualification standards to the Justices. See supra notes 376 & 441; see also 5 U.S.C.
app. 4 § 101(a), (d), (f)(11); 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 109(10); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The
constitutionality of those longstanding ethics statutes has never been seriously questioned.
See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A
Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 242 (1993) (“[P]ermitting Congress to
authorize judicial disciplinary procedures would not pose a significant threat to judicial
independence or the separation of powers.”).
457. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 313.
458. Id. at 323 (“No justice in Supreme Court history has consistently written with the
sarcasm of Justice Scalia.”).
459. Id. at 324–25 (recognizing that the Court “believes that the discipline of word and
page limits leads to better briefs,” and opining that “[t]he same is true for the Court”). But
he offers no specifics.
The Court could adopt internal operating rules that limit the number of published
pages allocated to separate opinions. It is difficult to justify publishing a disrespectful
opinion of a lone dissenter, particularly when publishing dissents seemed only to encourage
Justice Scalia to write more frequent, longer, and ever more disrespectful dissents that
often disparaged the Court itself. The Court could also disqualify any disrespectful separate
opinion from publication. A dissent of this type could be preserved as part of the case
record, but might appear only on the Court’s website or elsewhere instead of being
published with the opinion of the Court.
460. Id. at 328. Dean Chemerinsky observes that “with the exception of a few laws, the
laws regulating ethics that all other judges must follow are not applicable to the Supreme
Court.” Id. But the relevant statutes that do apply are significant. The Ethics in Government
Act, which requires financial disclosures by federal employees, expressly applies to the
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American Judicature Society has advanced the same proposal.461
This author agrees. No constitutional, statutory, or even
jurisprudential impediment prevents the Court from adopting an
internal resolution to apply the Code to its own members.462 If

40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 90 Side B
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Justices. See 5 U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 101(a), (d), (f)(11), 109(10). The judicial disqualification
statute does as well. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see also note 440, supra.
Although the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980 does not reach Supreme Court Justices, see 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1), this means only
that the Judicial Conference lacks express authority to apply the Code for U.S. Judges to
them. But just as Congress extended statutory ethics requirements to the Justices, it could
amend § 351(d)(1) to extend the Conference’s authority to include the Supreme Court. See
note 398, supra, and accompanying text; but see 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 5, 11
(expressing opposition to extending the Code to Justices).
461. Editorial, Supreme Court Justices and the Code of Conduct, 95 JUDICATURE 4, 4
(July–Aug. 2011) [hereinafter Justices and the Code] (calling on Court to apply Code for
U.S. Judges to Justices).
462. See note 441, supra. The Justices themselves are apparently not of one mind as to
whether the Court has already done so. Asked at a 2011 congressional hearing why the
Code for U.S. Judges does not apply to the Supreme Court, Justices Kennedy and Breyer
testified in ways that were not entirely in harmony. Justice Kennedy responded that the
Code applies to the extent that the Court has adopted an internal resolution to voluntarily
comply. Justice Breyer explained his belief that the Code applies, calling statements to the
contrary a reflection of “wrong thinking.” He also reported that he consults the ethics rules
for federal district judges, as well as outside ethics experts and other resources. Supreme
Court 2012 Budget, Hearing Before the H. Appropriations Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. &
Gen. Gov’t, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 14, 2011), available at https://www.c-span.org/
video/?299037-1/supreme-court-2012-budget&start=1687# (partial transcript on file with
author).
Justices Breyer and Kennedy may have misunderstood the question as well as the
relevant Code provisions. First, the mandatory disqualification provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 have expressly applied to the Justices for more than forty years, even though Canon
3C of the Code does not. See note 441, supra, and accompanying text. Second, the Code
addresses a multitude of ethical issues that go well beyond disqualification. While Justice
Kennedy’s response referred to an internal Court resolution to comply with the Code, the
Chief Justice’s 2011 annual report issued several months later explained that “the Court has
had no reason to adopt the Code of Conduct as its definitive source of ethical guidance”
because Justices consult other sources as well. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 5. The
Chief Justice’s only reference to an “internal resolution” cited a 1991 Court resolution to
“follow the Judicial Conference regulations [on gifts and outside income] as a matter of
internal practice.” Id. at 6–7. But the statutory provisions that deal with financial
disclosures and restrictions on gifts have expressly applied to the Justices since 1978. See
note 441, supra, and accompanying text; see also 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–02, 503(3), 505(2).
The 2011 Report does not mention any Court resolution to comply with the Code.
In their Congressional testimony, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer
emphasized the unique role of Justices who, unlike other federal judges who can be
replaced if they recuse, have a “duty to sit” to avoid a tie vote. But research has suggested
that “in only a small fraction of cases in which one justice recuses him- or herself . . . does
a tie result,” and “recusals generally do not produce equally divided Courts.” Ryan Black
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the Court exercises its inherent constitutional authority to selfregulate by adopting the Code, it is hard to imagine how that
decision could be subject to constitutional challenge.463 To the
contrary, it would reflect well on the integrity of the Supreme
Court and that of the entire federal judiciary.
Compliance with the Code would not be onerous.464 Canon
3C already applies to the Justices because Congress amended its
language into the disqualification statute, which expressly
applies to them.465 The only other mandatory Code provisions
require judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety—surely not too much to ask of Justices who enjoy
life tenure.466 Aside from the Code’s provisions for
disqualification, which mirror the statutory requirements, all of
its other provisions are aspirational. And the Chief Justice
reported as recently as 2011 that individual Justices already
“consult” the Code for guidance on ethical issues.467
2. Legislative Initiatives
Some earlier legislative initiatives addressing judicial
conduct were reintroduced in 2017. Among them was the
Supreme Court Ethics Act,468 which would require the Court to
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& Lee Epstein, Recusals and the "Problem" of an Equally Divided Supreme Court, 7 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 80–81 (2005).
463. If the Court fails to adopt such a resolution, Congress could close the loophole
simply by redefining the term “judge” for purposes of the statute governing the filing and
processing of complaints, and by designating the Judicial Conference or the Court itself to
handle those complaints. See 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1) (“[T]he term ‘judge’ means a
circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge . . . .”); see also 28
U.S.C. § 620(b)(4) (directing Federal Judicial Center to provide staff, planning and
research support to Judicial Conference and its committees). But even if the Judicial
Conference lacks explicit regulatory “jurisdiction” over the Supreme Court, nothing
prevents the Court itself from complying with the norms of conduct that the federal
judiciary’s own policymaking body has endorsed. See 28 U.S.C. § 331.
464. Justices and the Code, supra note 461, at 5 (“[T]he rules are not burdensome.”).
465. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
466. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts,
shall hold their offices during good behaviour . . . .”).
467. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 5, 11.
468. News Release, Ofc. of Sen. Christopher S. Murphy, Murphy, Blumenthal,
Slaughter Introduce Supreme Court Ethics Bill to Restore Public Confidence in the
Nation’s Highest Court (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/
press-releases/murphy-blumenthal-slaughter-introduce-supreme-court-ethics-bill-to-restore
-public-confidence-in-the-nations-highest-court.
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adopt a code of ethics incorporating the canons of the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges, with appropriate modifications.469 And
some in Congress have called on the Court either to adopt the
Code or to subscribe to its own ethical rules.470
Another was the Judicial Transparency and Ethics
Enhancement Act,471 proposing an Inspector General for the
Judicial Branch who would be subject to removal by the Chief
Justice.472 The idea has generated some support473 as well as

06/11/2018 08:46:58

Judges are supposed to maintain impartiality. They’re supposed to be free from
conflicts of interest. An independent watchdog for the federal judiciary will help
its members comply with the ethics rules and promote credibility within the
judicial branch of government. The . . . Act will not only help ensure continued
public confidence in our federal courts and keep them beyond reproach, it will
strengthen our judicial branch.
115th Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Rec. S7892–93 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/
crec/2017/12/06/CREC-2017-12-06-pt1-PgS7892.pdf (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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469. Supreme Court Ethics Act of 2017, S. 835, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017). As of
Jan. 1, 2018, the Senate bill had ten co-sponsors, including several members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. All Information (Except Text) for S.835, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/835/all-info?r=2; see also Supreme Court
Ethics Act of 2017, H.R. 1960, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017). Virtually identical to the
Senate bill, the House bill had eighty co-sponsors by January 1, 2018. All Information
(Except Text) for H.R. 1960—Supreme Court Ethics Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1960/all-info?r=1.
470. H. Res. 568, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017). Similar proposals have been
introduced in Congress for years. See, e.g., Remus, supra note 364, at 69 & n.185 (citing
H.R. 862, 112th Cong. (2001), which would have imposed a code of judicial conduct on
Supreme Court Justices).
471. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act, S. 2195, 115th Cong., 1st
Sess. (2017) [hereinafter Transparency and Ethics Act]. Senator Grassley first introduced a
bill to create an Inspector General for the federal judiciary in 2006. All Information (Except
Text) for S.2195—Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2017,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2195/all-info.
472. Transparency and Ethics Act, supra note 471. Similar legislation was introduced
as early as 1995. See, e.g., Diane M. Hartmus, An Inspector General for the Federal
Courts, 81 JUDICATURE 188, 188 (Mar.-Apr. 1998). The idea has been considered by
Congress repeatedly ever since.
Senator Grassley’s remarks when the legislation was introduced reflected his reasons
for sponsoring the bill. He observed that two federal entities that receive less funding than
the federal judiciary both have their own Inspectors General (IG). He also expressed
concerns about judicial conduct and the effectiveness of Judicial Conference oversight of
misconduct-complaint processing:
[T]he current practice of self-regulation of judges with respect to ethics and the
judicial code of conduct has time and time again proven inadequate. In fact, in
the past seven years, the Senate received articles of impeachment for not one but
two Federal judges.
.....
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considerable controversy, including published accounts of
opposition by some Justices and former Justices.474
E. The Chief Justice’s 2018 New Year’s Resolution:
Revisiting Conduct Standards for Federal Judges
Two days after the Inspector General bill was re-introduced
in 2017, the media reported allegations of sexual improprieties
by Judge Kozinski.475 More women soon came forward, and the
Ninth Circuit began an investigation. Judge Kozinski apologized
and announced his immediate retirement.476
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473. Hartmus, supra note 472, at 219–20 (supporting concept but suggesting revisions
to then-most-recent bill); see also Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight in the
Federal Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 243, 267–69
(1999) (same). Professor Rotunda supported a similar proposal, criticizing the handling of
a misconduct complaint against a federal judge in the Ninth Circuit. Ronald D. Rotunda,
Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial Solution: An Inspector General for
the Courts, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 301, 310, 316–25 (2010) (explaining the benefits of an IG
in bolstering public confidence that judicial misconduct will be addressed).
474. See, e.g., Anthony J. Scirica, Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 779, 789–97 (2015) (reviewing IG proposals and explaining objections);
Eric Robbins, In re Nottingham, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 783, 794 (2010) (arguing
against IG proposal as impermissibly intruding on judicial independence); Rotunda, supra
note 473, at 301–02 & nn.5–8 (reporting former Justice O’Connor’s opposition); Lara A.
Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot Always
Be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 KY. L.J. 439,
464 (2009) (noting that renewed efforts to create IG had “elicited a condemning response
from the judiciary”); Donald E. Campbell, Should the Rooster Guard the Henhouse:
Evaluating the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 381, 407
(2009) (“[T]he proposed legislative cure is more harmful than the disease.”); Bruce Moyer,
Inspector General Bills Rile Judiciary, 53 FED. LAW. 10, 10 (June 2006) (reporting
“[w]idespread alarm [that] has gripped the federal judiciary” over IG proposals and
reporting its opposition to similar initiatives in 1996); Tori Richards, Warily Eyeing the
Idea of an I.G.: Congressional Bills Would Create an Inspector for Federal Courts, 5 ABA
J. E-REPORT 4 (May 19, 2006) (referring to Justice Ginsburg’s comment that the idea was
“really scary,” and reporting ABA’s opposition).
475. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused
of Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-miscon
duct/2017/12/08/1763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html?utm_term=.4706576
730f8.
476. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Federal Appeals Judge Announces Immediate
Retirement Amid Probe of Sexual Misconduct Allegations, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-appeals-judge-announces
-immediate-retirement-amid-investigation-prompted-by-accusations-of-sexual-misconduct/
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The Chief Justice, no doubt anticipating renewed
Congressional concern about Judicial Conference oversight of
judges’ conduct, addressed the issue in his 2017 year-end report
to Congress, announcing the formation of a working group to
study this “new challenge”:
Events in recent months have illuminated the depth of the
problem of sexual harassment in the workplace, and events
in the past few weeks have made clear that the judicial
branch is not immune. The judiciary will begin 2018 by
undertaking a careful evaluation of whether its standards of
conduct and its procedures for investigating and correcting
inappropriate behavior are adequate to ensure an exemplary
workplace for every judge and every court employee. . . .
These concerns warrant serious attention from all quarters
477
of the judicial branch.

Whether the working group’s study of judicial misconduct
will be broad enough include a review of the sort of intemperate
and disrespectful language that Justice Scalia used in his judicial
writing remains to be seen. But the Scalia approach—bullying
and bombast, invective and attack—and its effect on the Court
and the judicial system478 should be considered as part of the
group’s work and its recommendations for addressing and
preventing inappropriate judicial behavior.
F. Suggestions for Constructive Alternatives
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2017 /12 /18 /6e38ada4-e3fd-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e _ story.html?utm_term = .a3b10c15ea
56.
477. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2017 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 11–12, S.
CT. OF THE U.S. (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2017
year-endreport.pdf. The working group was assembled by the director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Chief Justice Roberts
Calls for Review of Procedures for Protecting Court Employees From Misconduct, CNN
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/20/politics/roberts-judicial-misconduct/
index.html.
478. See Ross, supra note 455, at 957–58 (“[I]ncivility among judges is in many ways
more troubling than is incivility in other branches of the legal profession or the government
because civility is one of the hallmarks of judicial temperament.”).
479. See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Justice Antonin Scalia Dead at 79, TIMES OF ISRAEL
(Feb. 14, 2016, 1:54 AM IST), https://www.timesofisrael.com/justice-antonin-scalia-dead
-at-79/ (referring to the “mocking Scalia who in 1993 criticized a decades-old test used by
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Justice Scalia’s reputation for vitriolic opinions still
resonates around the world.479 The Court can no longer ignore
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the court to decide whether laws or government policies violated the constitutionally
required separation of church and state,” and quoting Scalia rhetoric).
480. This is so even if the Court no longer includes a Justice cast in the Scalia mold.
See, e.g., Irin Carmon, Justice Ginsburg’s Cautious Radicalism, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/opinion/sunday/justice-ginsburgs-cautious-radicalism
.html (noting that Justice Scalia’s “fury on the bench” had by then “intensified,” and
reporting that Justice Ginsburg had suggested that he “tone down” his dissents because he
would be “more effective” if he were “not so polemical”).
481. 28 U.S.C. § 331.
482. See, e.g., Carmon, supra note 480 (reporting that “Justice Ginsburg likes to say she
is still a teacher” and that she “‘tr[ies] to teach through [her] opinions’”).
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the public perception that his scorched-earth approach to
dissents was approved (and perhaps encouraged) by the rest of
the Court. Every Justice should instead counsel fellow Justices
against issuing opinions that cast the Court in a negative light.480
And whatever becomes of the recently appointed working
group’s investigation, the Judicial Conference should undertake
its own study of judicial incivility, focusing on its impact on the
public perception of the federal courts, the profession of law,
and the legal system as a whole. As the policymaking body for
the federal courts, the Conference has the statutory obligation to
recommend changes that will “promote . . . fairness in
administration, the just determination of litigation, and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”481
The Conference is particularly well positioned to consider
the positive effect of the Seventh Circuit Standards that directly
apply to judges. If they have substantially improved civility in
the Seventh Circuit, the Conference should consider adding at
least some of those provisions to the Code of Conduct for U.S.
Judges. And the Conference should also see that the same
expectation of civility applies equally to the Justices of the
Supreme Court, whose conduct, right or wrong, sets the national
standard. Appointment to the nation’s highest Court demands
conduct worthy of the dignity of the office. Its members serve as
exemplars for civil public discourse. They may disagree in
dissent, but they must not demean. The reputation of the federal
judiciary depends on the Justices’ regulation of their own
conduct.
It has often been said that judges are teachers.482 But what
have other judges, lawyers, and future lawyers learned from
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinions? Far too many served only
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to teach a generation of Americans that incivility in judicial
writing is acceptable at the highest levels. A regrettable legacy
indeed.
VI. CONCLUSION
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483. President Trump, known for the belligerence of his own rhetoric, was among
Justice Scalia’s admirers. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, Pres. of the U.S., Remarks by
President Trump and Justice Gorsuch at Swearing-in of Justice Gorsuch to the Supreme
Court, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-justice-gorsuch-swearing-justice-gorsuch-supreme-court/ (calling
Justice Scalia “a terrific judge and a terrific person”).
484. See Thode, supra note 371, at 400 (observing that opinion-writing is within the
reach of the ABA Model Code (citing In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1975) (sanctioning
judge for issuing an opinion mocking the defendant’s livelihood)).
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In the current atmosphere of vituperative public discourse
and misconduct by celebrities, senior corporate officers, political
leaders, and even respected appellate judges, Congress will
continue to debate initiatives to address improper judicial
conduct. Existing means of judicial self-regulation have proved
insufficient. The federal judiciary must take affirmative steps to
address all inappropriate judicial behavior—intemperance
included.
Dissent need not rely on the invective, insult, and bullying
that were all too common in the Scalia years. These rhetorical
devices deaden our sense of proportion and our sense of
decency. The decline in civility of public discourse did not begin
with the last election cycle or the partisan deadlock in today’s
Congress. But perhaps the first few disrespectful Scalia dissents
helped pave the way—not just for his increasingly vitriolic
dissents later in life, but also for the remarkable decline in the
level of public discourse generally.483
Disrespectful language has no place in the work of the
federal judiciary, especially the Supreme Court.484 Many
Supreme Court Justices over the years have publicly expressed
support for civility and professionalism. But Justice Scalia
never did. Instead, he kept turning out dissents rife with
intemperance and invective. Some observers might justifiably
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regard the Court’s failure to stem the negative impact as silent
acquiescence in Justice Scalia’s incivility and disrespect.485
The Scalia era is over, but his regrettable legacy remains
for all time in the Court’s published opinions. It is up to the
Supreme Court to embrace a standard for judicial opinions that
exemplifies civility and professionalism. As every lawyer and
every judge knows, “I respectfully dissent” rings true only for
dissents that reflect measured, judicious, and civil disagreement
with the views of the majority.
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485. Justice Ginsburg encouraged Justice Scalia to moderate the disrespectful language
in his opinions. Carmon, supra note 480. Other Justices perhaps made similar attempts, but
no evidence suggests that the Court took action to curb Justice Scalia’s intemperance. Yet
bullies get away with bullying because good people stand by and do nothing. See, e.g.,
Martha Minow, Upstanders, Whistle-Blowers, and Rescuers, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 815,
815–16 (explaining that a “bystander” is a person “who is near but does not take part in
what is happening,” while an “upstander,” is just the opposite: someone who speaks out
against injustice, including those who “resist the temptations of silence and passivity” in
the face of injustice).

